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Did You Give the Government Your  
Baby’s DNA? Rethinking Consent in 
Newborn Screening 
Sonia M. Suter* 
ABSTRACT 
Newborn screening (NBS) has long offered the possibility of 
identifying rare conditions, which can be lethal or debilitating if 
not detected and treated quickly in the newborn period. These 
screening programs, usually mandatory, have been well 
established in every state since the 1960s. In the last decade, the 
number of conditions screened for has risen exponentially to 
include more than fifty inborn errors of metabolism, blood 
disorders, genetic, or other conditions. Not surprisingly, 
newborn screening programs have been widely accepted for their 
potential to save the lives of countless children. 
Despite their valuable public health benefits, however, old 
approaches to, and more recent expansions of, NBS raise 
important privacy and policy concerns. NBS samples are 
collected in most states without affirmative, or sometimes any, 
consent from parents. NBS programs now screen for an ever-
broadening range of diseases—sometimes without careful 
assessment of the risks and benefits—including conditions for 
which there is no treatment. NBS samples are retained for long 
periods or indefinitely. And finally, few, if any, limits prevent 
potentially invasive uses of these samples by the government or 
third parties. Indeed, evidence suggests that a great deal of 
research is being conducted on these stored blood spots, the 
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collection and storage of which many parents are simply 
unaware. Only a few lawsuits and legislatures have addressed 
the legality of these practices. 
With recent expansions in the scope of NBS and increased 
interest in these samples for research, it is time to take a fresh 
look at this long-standing public-health system and to reexamine 
some of the underlying philosophies and practices associated 
with it. While NBS offers important public health benefits, it 
also threatens some of the civil liberties of the parents and 
children involved. This piece argues for the need to strike a 
careful balance between the public goods and private interests, 
and describes a methodology that allows these competing values 
to be recognized in policymaking. It concludes by suggesting 
ways to balance the important values of maximizing the well-
being of newborns and promoting research, while also protecting 
autonomy and privacy as much as possible. 
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INTRODUCTION 
If you ask parents whether their child should undergo 
genetic testing or participate in research, most would probably 
say, consistent with legal norms in most areas of medicine, 
“only with my consent!” Yet the majority of parents do not 
realize that in every state, a small blood sample is collected 
from newborns to test for inborn errors of metabolism (many of 
which are inherited).1 Nor do they realize that, in many states, 
                                                          
 1. See Taralyn Tan, Newborns’ DNA: Don’t Deny Scientists This Useful 
Resource, GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECH. NEWS (Apr. 13, 2010), 
http://www.genengnews.com/gen-articles/newborns-dna-don-t-denyscientists-
this-useful-resource/4377 (“[I]n most cases, parents are not aware that the 
blood sample from their child is being kept at all.”). 
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the dried blood spots (DBS) are retained for long periods or 
indefinitely, with few, if any, limits on third-party access to and 
uses of these samples.2 Indeed, evidence suggests that a great 
deal of research is being conducted on these stored blood spots 
by the state and other entities.3 All of this, from collection to 
retention of samples, often comes without parents’ affirmative, 
let alone informed, consent.4 
The impetus for mandatory newborn screening (NBS) is the 
fact that rarely, but quite significantly, a child will be born with 
abnormal levels of enzymes, metabolites, or other chemicals, 
which can be lethal or debilitating if not detected and treated in 
time.5 NBS offers the possibility of identifying some of these 
conditions before clinical symptoms manifest and “before 
developmental disabilities or death occurs.”6 These, usually 
mandatory, screening programs have been well established in 
every state since the 1960s, potentially saving the lives of 
countless children.7 The scope of NBS programs has expanded 
dramatically in recent years, with most states screening for 
between twenty-seven8 and over fifty inborn errors of 
                                                          
 2. See Lori Andrews, Public Choices and Private Choices: Legal 
Regulation of Genetic Testing, in JUSTICE AND THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 
46, 55 (Timothy F. Murphy & Marc A. Lappé eds., 1994) (noting that genetic 
information can change lives, “precipitated by the release of genetic 
information to third parties—such as when insurers or employers make 
adverse decisions against people based on genetic information”); Tan, supra 
note 1 (discussing DNA warehousing and the indefinite retention of samples). 
 3. See, e.g., Tan, supra note 1 (“[S]torage . . . allows geneticists and 
neonatology researchers access to an incredible genetic database. These blood 
spot samples can be utilized to develop new genetic tests, to learn more about 
existing genetic disorders, and to study factors such as the mother’s health and 
in utero environment in relation to rare disorders.”). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Newborn Screening, Pediatric Genetics, CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/pediatricgenetics/
newborn_screening.html (last updated May 13, 2013) (discussing the 
importance of newborn screening and the benefits derived from the process). 
 6. See Michael S. Watson et al., Newborn Screening: Toward a Uniform 
Screening Panel and System, 8 GENETICS MED. 1S, 1S (Supp. May 2006) 
(“States and territories mandate newborn screening of all infants born within 
their jurisdiction for certain disorders that may not otherwise be detected 
before developmental disability or death occurs.”). 
 7. Id. (discussing the importance of the state-based newborn screening 
programs that began over forty years ago). 
 8. STEFAN TIMMERMANS & MARA BUCHBINDER, SAVING BABIES? THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF NEWBORN GENETIC SCREENING 59 (2013) (“By 2010, all 
states screened for 27 . . . conditions.”); Wylie Burke et al., Genetic Screening, 
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metabolism.9 Some of these conditions have been added to the 
list without careful assessment of the risks and benefits,10 and 
some are identified and reported with no known effective 
treatment.11 
Even so, NBS has been a well-accepted part of our public 
health system for nearly half a century.12 Recently, a few 
lawsuits have challenged the consent requirements with respect 
to NBS and related research. In 2003, a couple claimed that 
Nebraska’s efforts to compel the screening of their newborn 
violated their religious freedom and parental rights.13 The 
Nebraska Supreme Court found no such violation.14 
                                                          
33 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVIEWS 148, 149 (2011) (“In the United States, most 
states screen for at least 29 conditions . . . .”); see also ASSESSING GENETIC 
RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 66 (Lori B. Andrews et 
al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter AGR] (“Newborns are usually screened today for 
several inborn errors of metabolism . . . .”). 
 9. See Louise Moody & Kubra Choudhry, Parental Views on Informed 
Consent for Expanded Newborn Screening, 16 HEALTH EXPECTATIONS 239, 239 
(2011) (mentioning that all states now screen for fifty-three core conditions to 
detect inherited metabolic diseases). This range of conditions includes what are 
described as twenty-nine core conditions and a secondary group of twenty-five 
targets that can be identified by screening for the core set. TIMMERMANS & 
BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 50, 63. 
 10. See Beth A. Tarini et al., Waiving Informed Consent in Newborn 
Screening Research: Balancing Social Value and Respect, 148C AM. J. MED. 
GENETICS 23, 23–24 (2008) (mentioning that “new NBS tests have rarely been 
subjected to population-based study” and demonstrating the difficulties of 
assessing risks and benefits). 
 11. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 58 (“Given the current state of 
development of medical genetics,  . . .  effective treatment for genetic disorders 
is rare . . . .”); Ellen Wright Clayton, Currents in Contemporary Ethics: State 
Run Newborn Screening in the Genomic Era, or How to Avoid Drowning When 
Drinking from a Fire Hose, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 697, 698 (2010) (noting that 
for many of the reported results of newborn screening, “the efficacy and utility 
of therapeutic and preventative interventions are not clear”). 
 12. Watson, supra note 6, at 1S. 
 13. See Douglas Cnty. v. Anaya, 694 N.W.2d 601, 604 (Neb. 2005) 
(discussing the Anaya’s argument that the requirement violated their “First 
Amendment right to free exercise of religion and their fundamental rights as 
parents”). 
 14. Id. at 608 (concluding that the requirement did not “unlawfully burden 
the Anayas’ right to freely exercise their religion” or “unlawfully burden their 
parental rights,” mentioning the lack of evidence that the state had an anti-
religious purpose in enforcing the law and the valid policy interests in 
addressing the health and safety of children born in Nebraska). 
2014] CONSENT IN NEWBORN SCREENING 733 
 
The more recent “Baby DNA Lawsuits”15 have challenged 
the involuntary collection and dissemination of NBS samples to 
researchers for purposes other than NBS.16 In Minnesota, the 
state Supreme Court ruled that the state’s dissemination and 
use of newborns’ DBS for research without obtaining written 
informed consent violated its Genetic Privacy Act.17 Two similar 
lawsuits were brought in Texas. The state settled with the five 
plaintiff parents in the first suit after agreeing to destroy all 
samples collected without parental consent since 2002.18 A class 
action filed in late 2010 in Texas was dismissed as moot 
because there was no evidence that the parties’ newborn 
samples were actually used or distributed for research.19 
I argue in this Article that these lawsuits and other 
developments in NBS should give pause to the presumption 
that parental consent is not necessary with respect to NBS. We 
already obtain much more information from NBS than we did in 
the past and we are on the cusp of being able to obtain 
substantially more information in the near future. Moreover, 
the nature of the information we will be able to glean will be of 
varied value, certainty, and complexity, raising issues not only 
about what diseases we should screen for, but whether parents 
should be required to consent to some or all parts of the NBS 
process. In addition, the fact that newborn samples are 
increasingly used for research, and that anonymization of 
biospecimens is increasingly difficult, supports the need to 
                                                          
 15. K.J. Mullins, Bill to Ban Unauthorized Use of Infant DNA Clears 
Senate Committee, DIGITAL J. (Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.digitaljournal.com/
article/287446. 
 16. See id. (pointing out that NBS samples are used for unauthorized 
research). 
 17. Bearder v. Minnesota, 806 N.W.2d 766, 776 (Minn. 2011) (holding that 
there is no authority in the statute to disseminate blood samples or genetic 
information, without consent, “beyond that expressly authorized for the 
reporting of newborn test results”). See generally MINN. STAT. §13.386 (2010) 
(Minnesota’s Genetic Privacy Act). 
 18. See Higgins v. Tex. Dep’t of Health Servs., 801 F. Supp. 2d 541, 545–46 
(W.D. Tex. 2011) (discussing the settlement of the earlier Beleno lawsuit, and 
the agreement to “destroy all blood specimens taken as part of the newborn 
screening program” prior to May 2009, for which no written consent existed); 
Allison M. Whelan, Note, That’s My Baby: Why the State’s Interest in 
Promoting Public Health Does Not Justify Residual Newborn Blood Spot 
Research Without Parental Consent, 98 MINN. L. REV. 419, 430–31 (2013). 
 19. Higgins, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 554 (“Plaintiffs never refute Defendants’ 
evidence that Plaintiffs’ children’s blood samples were not distributed and have 
in fact been destroyed. Accordingly . . . their claims are now moot.”). 
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rethink the role of consent in NBS, at least with respect to 
storage and research uses of DBS. As I will argue, the case for 
consent with respect to research also supports, in part, the 
notion of consent for NBS itself. 
Yet, just as changing circumstances provide reasons to 
rethink parental consent with respect to NBS, the increasing 
scope of information we can glean from NBS makes the 
possibility of obtaining fully informed consent that much more 
problematic logistically, practically, and economically. In 
addition, the DBS are potentially valuable resources for 
research that can benefit the common good, generally, and the 
pediatric population, in particular. Thus, the question of 
consent in NBS raises issues about how to strike the right 
balance between the public good and private interests. 
This Article offers a proposal for finding the right balance 
of consent for NBS itself, and for the storage and use of DBS. 
Part I offers a history of NBS and its evolution. Part II explores 
the rationales for the limited consent provisions for NBS as well 
as the growing practice of retaining these samples and using 
them for purposes that go beyond the original goals of NBS. 
Part III highlights the ways in which the public good comes into 
conflict with the private interests and describes a methodology 
that allows for these competing values to be recognized in 
policymaking. It concludes by suggesting that requiring 
affirmative consent for NBS and for research on DBS best 
balances the values of protecting the newborn’s well-being and 
promoting research, while also protecting autonomy and privacy 
as much as possible. 
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF NEWBORN SCREENING 
NBS begins with a heel prick and the collection of a few 
drops of blood on filter paper, or Guthrie cards.20 It is a 
preventive health measure that involves the analysis of the 
newborn’s blood for various medical conditions, many of which 
are inherited, including certain inborn errors of metabolism and 
                                                          
 20. See AGR, supra note 8, at 39 (“This test could be performed on a spot of 
blood obtained from a heel prick before the infant left the hospital nursery.”). 
The Guthrie cards are named after Dr. Robert Guthrie, who developed the first 
NBS assay for phenylketonuria. Clayton, supra note 11, at 697; Spotlight on 
NBS Researchers, Robert Guthrie, MD, PhD, NEWBORN SCREENING 
TRANSLATIONAL RES. NETWORK, https://www.nbstrn.org/about/spotlight/
Guthrie (last visited Mar. 6, 2014). 
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blood disorders.21 The value of conducting screening during the 
newborn period is both practical and clinically significant. Most 
infants are born in hospitals, which makes the systematic 
collection of samples easier at this stage of life than nearly any 
other.22 In addition, for many of the diseases screened, 
treatment must be started in the newborn period to prevent the 
development of clinical symptoms.23 
As its name suggests, NBS is a screening program in which 
an abnormal result does not necessarily identify the presence of 
disease. It merely indicates an increased risk that the child has 
the condition, necessitating confirmation through diagnostic 
testing.24 
With its inception nearly fifty years ago, NBS is the longest 
program of genetic screening in the history of genetics.25 The 
first state program screened for phenylketonuria (PKU), a 
disease in which the child lacks a vital enzyme that breaks 
down the amino acid, phenylalanine.26 Without this enzyme, 
phenylalanine can accumulate in the brain, causing mental 
retardation, unless the affected child eats a phenylalanine-free 
diet.27 The first program, developed in Massachusetts, was 
                                                          
 21. E.g., Newborn Screening, supra note 5. 
 22. See MARIAN F. MACDORMAN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH 
STATISTICS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HOME BIRTHS IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1990–2009, at 1 (2012) (showing that only 0.72% of births took 
place in the home in 2009). 
 23. E.g., Newborn Screening Tests, KIDSHEALTH, http://kidshealth.org/
parent/system/medical/newborn_screening_tests.html# (last visited Mar. 1, 
2014) (“[E]arly diagnosis and proper treatment can make the difference 
between lifelong impairment and healthy development.”); see also Clayton, 
supra note 11, at 697 (discussing the policy behind newborn screening and the 
rationale of “adding disorders to the newborn screening panel only if early 
detection and treatment could avert serious harm”). 
 24. AGR, supra note 8, at 65 (“These screening tools are not definitive 
diagnostic tests, however, and positive results must be confirmed through 
specific testing for the disease in question.”). 
 25. See Nancy S. Green et al., Newborn Screening: Complexities in 
Universal Genetic Testing, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1955, 1955 (“Newborn 
Screening (NBS) is the first and largest example of systematic, populationwide 
genetic testing . . . .”). 
 26. AGR, supra note 8, at 66. 
 27. See id. (stating that “high phenylalanine levels” can lead to mental 
retardation, and that a phenylalanine dietary restriction is “highly effective in 
preventing mental retardation”). The deficient enzyme is called phenylalanine 
hydroxylase. Id. 
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voluntary.28 This is in sharp contrast, as I will address in Part 
II, to what is essentially mandatory screening in many states. 
Most states do not require affirmative parental consent under 
the theory either that the police powers justify this public 
health measure or under the doctrine of parens patriae.29 
While PKU was the primary disease screened for in the 
early days of NBS, the panel of NBS diseases has expanded 
considerably in the last few years. The initial expansion, 
however, was quite slow, with only a few diseases added per 
decade.30 As late as 2003, the number of diseases screened for in 
most states was still quite low—eight or fewer diseases.31 
Technological advances, however, changed that. While initial 
NBS required a separate assay for each disorder, the 
development of tandem mass spectrometry (MS/MS) in the 
1990s allowed for the identification of over forty conditions 
through a single test,32 contributing greatly to the expansion of 
                                                          
 28. See Newborn Screening Task Force, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Serving 
the Family from Birth to the Medical Home: Newborn Screening: A Blueprint 
for the Future—A Call for a National Agenda on State Newborn Screening 
Programs, 106 PEDIATRICS 389, 389 (2000) [hereinafter NBSTF] (“By 1962, 
Massachusetts launched a voluntary newborn PKU screening program that 
demonstrated the feasibility of mass genetic screening.”). Initially, “the 
American Medical Association (AMA) and its state organizations opposed 
mandatory screening as an infringement of physicians’ rights to regulate their 
professional practice.” TIMMERMANS & BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 38. 
 29. See infra Part II.A. 
 30. See Burke et al., supra note 8, at 149 (providing background 
information on the expansion of NBS). 
 31. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-449, NEWBORN 
SCREENING: CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE PROGRAMS 2 (2003) [hereinafter 
GAO], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03449.pdf (“While the 
number of genetic and metabolic disorders included in state newborn screening 
programs range from 4 to 36, most states screen for 8 or fewer disorders.”). 
 32. See Cecilia I. Kaye et al., Introduction to the Newborn Screening Fact 
Sheets, 118 PEDIATRICS 1304, 1307, 1310 (2006) (discussing how MS/MS has 
led to additional disorders added to screening panels and the essential role 
played by pediatricians throughout the process). See generally Bridget Wilcken 
et al., Screening Newborns for Inborn Errors of Metabolism by Tandem Mass 
Spectrometry, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2304, 2309 (2003) (“It is now possible to 
screen rapidly, simultaneously, and inexpensively for a number of very rare 
disorders with the use of tandem mass spectrometry.”). Tandem mass 
spectrometry screens for inborn errors of metabolism by measuring the levels 
of various metabolites in the blood. Id. at 2305. Abnormalities in the levels of 
these metabolites suggest the presence of metabolic disorders. Mary Ann Baily 
& Thomas H. Murray, Ethics, Evidence, and Cost in Newborn Screening, 
HASTINGS CENTER REP., May–June 2008, at 23, 25. MS/MS can also screen for 
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NBS.33 After several years of much variability in screening 
practices, a consensus began to emerge about the need for more 
uniformity in NBS, especially with respect to screening 
panels.34 The American College of Medical Genetics (ACMG) 
issued recommendations for the standardization of the selection 
of NBS diseases in 2005, which were endorsed by several 
professional groups.35 Now every state tests or will test for a 
minimum of twenty-nine conditions.36 Some panels include over 
fifty disorders.37   
As technologies allow us to test for more diseases more 
efficiently, the question of what diseases should be included in 
each state’s NBS panel remains difficult and, as we shall see 
later, has some bearing on the question of whether parental 
consent should be required. Among the relevant criteria are, of 
course, scientific considerations, such as the prevalence of the 
condition in the population, the validity of the NBS test, and 
the efficacy of available treatments.38 But other non-scientific 
considerations also play a vital role. Political concerns—such as 
                                                          
PKU and other amino acid disorders, but it does not allow for the testing of all 
NBS disorders. Kaye et al., supra at 1310. 
 33. TIMMERMANS & BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 17. Interestingly, in the 
United Kingdom, “there was insufficient evidence and cost-effectiveness to 
support tandem mass spectrometry technologies for newborn screening,” 
whereas in the United States, these factors did not inhibit the use of this 
technology because “cost-effectiveness is often neglected within health policy 
discussions, due to cultural anxieties about healthcare rationing.” Id. at 58. 
 34. Id. at 34 (“The United States is one of only two industrialized countries 
without a national newborn screening policy.”). 
 35. Id. at 50, 59. Although the report was one of the most controversial 
reports on NBS issued by an advisory body, it was also one of the most 
influential, in large part because it was strongly endorsed by such groups as 
the March of Dimes Foundation; The American Academy of Pediatrics; the 
Association of Women’s Health, Obstetric and Neonatal Nurses; and the 
Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Heritable Disorders in Newborns and 
Children. Id. at 59. 
 36. Id. at 50; Watson et al., supra note 6, at 1S (“[T]he expert panel 
identified 29 conditions for which screening should be mandated.”). I should 
note that I was part of the panel. 
 37. Moody & Choudhry, supra note 9, at 239 (“All states in the USA now 
screen for 53 core conditions . . . .”). 
 38. The “classical” criteria used by states in determining which conditions 
to include in their NBS panels were derived from a seminal paper for the 
World Health Organization by Wilson and Jungner. See Heather Harrell, 
Currents in Contemporary Ethics: The Role of Parents in Expanded Newborn 
Screening, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 846, 846–47 (2009) (discussing Wilson and 
Jungner’s ten criteria to apply when considering population screening). 
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the existence of advocacy groups39 and cost-benefit analysis40—
are also hugely influential. And, of course, ethical 
considerations should and often do come into play.41 For 
example, because the benefits to the newborn, to the family, 
and to society do not necessarily overlap, decision makers must 
decide whose benefits should determine the selection of the 
screening panel. 
If the goal of NBS is to benefit the newborn, the panel of 
diseases should be limited to those for which we have effective 
treatments or early intervention and whose natural history we 
understand well. If we also consider the benefits to the family, 
however, the panel of diseases might be broader because it 
would include diseases with no treatment that might help 
parents make better informed reproductive decisions about 
                                                          
 39. In the context of NBS, parents have been strong advocates for 
expanding the array of tests. Advocacy and lobbying have been strong forces in 
the development and evolution of NBS. As Ellen Wright Clayton observes, NBS 
laws were influenced more by individual practitioners and political groups 
than anything else. Clayton, supra note 11, at 697–98 (discussing how most 
programs in the United States were driven by a report endorsed by the 
government committees and parent advocacy groups); see TIMMERMANS & 
BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 39, 44–48, 59–61 (describing the powerful role of 
advocacy in promoting NBS and its expansion). 
 40. See Harrell, supra note 38, at 846–47 (explaining that the criteria 
when considering population testing boils down to screening “illnesses that are 
sufficiently understood” and can be tested in a cost-effective manner). One of 
the reasons PKU screening was so widely applauded was its high cost savings 
of $93,000 per detected case. Report of the NIH Consensus Development 
Conference on Phenylketonuria (PKU): Screening & Management: Chapter II, 
NAT’L INST. CHILD HEALTH & HUM. DEV., https://www.nichd.nih.gov/
publications/pubs/pku/Pages/sub30.aspx (last updated Dec. 21, 2011). The costs 
of screening per detected case, however, can sometimes be quite large. See 
OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., HEALTHY CHILDREN: INVESTING IN 
THE FUTURE 106–11 (1988) (demonstrating the variability in cost amongst 
different screening and testing strategies). Some groups, such as the March of 
Dimes, have taken the view that newborns should be screened regardless of 
how rare the disorder is, in essence rejecting considerations of cost-benefit 
analysis. See Newborn Screening, MARCH OF DIMES, http://
www.marchofdimes.com/baby/newborn-screening.aspx (last visited Mar. 26, 
2014) (expressing their desire for mandatory testing of extremely rare diseases, 
most of which, but not all, can be treated or dealt with). This perspective is 
more political or ethical than scientific, since it may not result in the greatest 
health benefit to the community, though it is quite a sympathetic position from 
the perspective of the individual families who benefit from such an approach. 
See Press Release, N.Y. Dep’t of Health, State Health Department Receives 
March of Dimes Award for National Leadership in Newborn Screening (Dec. 
14, 2007) (lauding New York’s comprehensive NBS program). 
 41. See infra text accompanying notes 42–44. 
2014] CONSENT IN NEWBORN SCREENING 739 
 
whether to undergo prenatal testing with future pregnancies.42 
In addition, such information can avoid diagnostic odysseys, 
when parents search long and hard for the diagnosis of a rare 
condition.43 Finally, if we focus on the benefits to society, the 
panel of diseases would be even larger, including conditions 
about which we have limited knowledge and no effective 
treatments so that we can identify potential research subjects to 
learn more about the natural history of the disease.44 
For some time, the consensus has been that the benefits to 
the newborn should be decisive in selecting conditions for NBS 
since the raison d’être of the program is to protect infants from 
debilitating diseases.45 Despite this consensus, these criteria 
have not always been followed in practice.46 Because state 
health departments have substantial discretion to decide which 
                                                          
 42. Many parents would seek prenatal testing with future pregnancies, 
even if they did not plan to terminate affected pregnancies. Peter T. Rowley, 
Parental Receptivity to Neonatal Sickle Trait Identification, 83 PEDIATRICS 891, 
892 (1989) (noting that most women at risk for having a child with sickle cell 
anemia wanted prenatal testing even though only one quarter would terminate 
the pregnancy if the fetus were affected). But see Ranjeet Grover et al., 
Newborn Screening for Hemoglobinopathies: The Benefit Beyond the Target, 76 
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1236, 1236–37 (1986) (reporting that fourteen out of 
twenty-three women at risk for having a child with sickle cell anemia had an 
amniocentesis and three of the four affected pregnancies were terminated). 
Some have observed that this rationale for NBS makes it less about protecting 
the newborn and more about eugenic goals of eradicating undesirable 
conditions in the population. See, e.g., TWILA BRASE, CITIZENS COUNCIL ON 
HEALTH CARE, NEWBORN GENETIC SCREENING THE NEW EUGENICS? THE CASE 
FOR INFORMED CONSENT REQUIREMENTS FOR GENETIC TESTING, BABY DNA 
STORAGE AND GENETIC RESEARCH 1 (2009), available at http://
www.cchfreedom.org/pr/NBS_EUGENICS_REPORT_Apr2009_FINAL.pdf. 
 43. Baily & Murray, supra note 32, at 28–29. 
 44. TIMMERMANS & BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 51 (describing how 
consideration of not just individual benefits, but also benefits to the family and 
society is an example of “‘benefit creep’”). 
 45. See J.M.G. WILSON & G. JUNGNER, WORLD HEALTH ORG., PRINCIPLES 
AND PRACTICE OF SCREENING FOR DISEASE 14 (1968) (stating that the aim of 
early detection is to protect the individual). For a broader discussion and 
criticism of the shift in focus of some NBS programs from benefit to the infant 
to benefit to the family and society, see generally PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON 
BIOETHICS, THE CHANGING MORAL FOCUS OF NEWBORN SCREENING: AN 
ETHICAL ANALYSIS BY THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS (2008), 
available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/newborn_screening/
index.html (discussing the shift from focusing primarily on what benefits the 
infant to a “broader conception of benefit”). 
 46. See generally COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF INBORN ERRORS OF 
METABOLISM, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., GENETIC SCREENING: PROGRAMS, 
PRINCIPLES AND RESEARCH 228 (1975) (listing unacceptable aims of NBS).  
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tests to include for NBS, there is little oversight.47 Even the 
ACMG recommendations, which expressly declare that the 
benefit to the newborn should drive the selection of disease,48 
include a panel of diseases, not all of which directly or indirectly 
benefit the newborn.49 
Several factors have contributed to, and will likely further 
contribute to, the expansion of NBS, not all of which directly 
benefits the newborn. Technological advances, such as MS/MS, 
have contributed to this expansion.50 Other technologies, like 
DNA microarrays, will make it possible to screen for a slew of 
genetic conditions.51 With the possibility of ever-cheaper whole 
genome sequencing, it is not hard to imagine a time, in the not 
too distant future, when NBS will be expanded to include whole 
genome sequencing.52 Indeed, the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) recently funded pilot programs to “explore the promise—
and ethical challenges—of sequencing every newborn’s 
                                                          
 47. See AGR, supra note 8, at 67 (stating that typically state health 
departments have broad discretion to introduce tests, often with little 
oversight, which can lead to testing for genetic conditions with little clinical 
significance). 
 48. Watson et al., supra note 6, at 2S. The approach to selecting diseases 
awarded points for clear benefits to family and society, as well as points for 
individual benefits, which were weighted more heavily. TIMMERMANS & 
BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 51–52. 
 49. Specifically the group proposed mandated screening for a panel of 
twenty-nine conditions and suggested that an additional twenty-five be 
reported to families. Watson et al., supra note 6, at 1S. Because there is no 
treatment for some of these diseases, they did not meet the standard criteria 
for NBS. Baily & Murray, supra note 32, at 26; Watson et al., supra note 6, at 
1S; see also Jeffrey R. Botkin et al., Newborn Screening Technology: Proceed 
with Caution, 117 PEDIATRICS 1793, 1796 (2006) (discussing the issues with 
offering results for a large number of conditions for which limited or no 
evidence of benefits exist). 
 50. This would not be the first time that medical diagnostics have been 
driven as much or more by technology than by need. See Sonia Mateu Suter, 
The Routinization of Prenatal Testing, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 233, 233 (2002) (“A 
product of the technology era, genetics has, in a short time, offered vast 
amounts of information.”). 
 51. DNA microarrays allow researchers to analyze thousands of active 
genes at a time, which could allow them to search for huge numbers of genetic 
disease mutations at one time. DNA Microarray Technology, NAT’L HUM. 
GROWTH RES. INST. (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.genome.gov/10000533. 
 52. See FRANCIS S. COLLINS, THE LANGUAGE OF LIFE: DNA AND THE 
REVOLUTION IN PERSONALIZED MEDICINE 208 (2010) (“[It is] almost 
certain . . . that complete genome sequencing will become part of newborn 
screening in the next few years.”). 
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genome.”53 This is consistent with the development of 
personalized medicine and the belief that it is responsible and 
empowering to get as much medical information as possible.54 
So far, most of the expansions of NBS have been beneficial, 
although the data about “long-term clinical outcomes” are 
limited.55 The lives of many children, who might have died 
years ago because their state did not screen for medium chain 
acyl-coenzyme A dehydrogenase deficiency (MCADD), for 
example, have been saved by the introduction of MCADD 
testing in all states.56 Even so, the expansion of NBS is not 
without costs. The more conditions we screen for, the greater 
the risk of the inevitable artifacts of any screening program: 
false negatives, false positives, and clinical and diagnostic 
uncertainty. False negatives may create false reassurance and 
slow the process of diagnosis; because pediatricians know that 
NBS is done for all children, they may assume that the child 
does not have one of the NBS diseases based on the negative 
NBS result.57 
False positives present the opposite problem.58 When a 
child is reported as being positive for one of the NBS conditions, 
                                                          
 53. Jocelyn Kaiser, NIH Studies Explore Promise of Sequencing Babies’ 
Genomes, SCI. MAG. (Sept. 4, 2013, 2:45 PM), http://news.sciencemag.org/
biology/2013/09/nih-studies-explore-promise-sequencing-babies%E2%80%99-
genomes. 
 54. See Suter, supra note 50, at 233–34 (noting the strong desire to use 
technology to get as much information as possible, but also cautioning that 
knowledge can be toxic at times). 
 55. TIMMERMANS & BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 184. 
 56. See Baily & Murray, supra note 32, at 23–24 (discussing Mississippi’s 
response to MCADD and the benefits to its newborn population). However, not 
all deaths due to MCADD have been eliminated with NBS. See TIMMERMANS & 
BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 185. 
 57. False negatives can occur because of failures in the administration of 
NBS: failure to perform the test properly, to record the results, or simply to 
test. But false negatives can also occur even if everything is done correctly 
because NBS is a screening test—it is not diagnostic. AGR, supra note 8, at 40. 
False negatives may have become less of a problem in the last five to ten years, 
but state health departments recognize the possibility of false negatives. ARIZ. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH SERVS., ARIZONA NEWBORN SCREENING PROGRAM: 
GUIDELINES 42–43 (2010), available at http://www.azdhs.gov/lab/aznewborn/
documents/providers/AZ-Newborn-Screening-Provider-Guidelines.pdf (revised 
Jan. 2011). 
 58. False positives may result from errors in the testing process 
(testing/analysis or reporting), but in general, false positives are an 
unavoidable consequence of screening for extremely rare disorders. But like 
false negatives, they are also inevitable artifacts of any screening program. The 
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the family can experience a great deal of anxiety and confusion. 
Some studies have shown that false positives can have an 
adverse effect on the relationship between parent and child, 
including parents’ continued worries about the child’s health 
even after learning that she did not have the condition after 
all.59 In addition, false positives may have a negative health 
impact on the child by requiring follow-up testing and 
treatment until it is determined that the child is unaffected; 
further testing and treatment both pose potential medical 
risks.60 Children who have false positive results are often 
mislabeled as ill even though they do not display any clinical 
symptoms.61 
The recent and rapid expansion of NBS panels may also 
result in the diagnosis of conditions for which there is no 
treatment, which may create unnecessary stress and anxiety for 
the family and affect the parent-child relationship. For 
example, parents may pursue costly treatment odysseys, hoping 
to find a cure even though no proven treatment exists.62 While 
such information may help parents with future reproductive 
decision making, this rationale moves NBS away from its stated 
purpose of benefitting the newborn. Moreover, it undercuts the 
                                                          
incidence of false positives can be quite high. “Some states have a [positive 
predictive value] of only 3%, meaning that 97% of infants who initially test 
positive do not actually have the disease.” Whelan, supra note 18, at 438. 
 59. See K. Fyrö & G. Bodegård, Four-Year Follow-up of Psychological 
Reactions to False Positive Screening Tests for Congenital Hypothyroidism, 76 
ACTA PAEDIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 107, 107, 111 (1987) (finding that a 
significant portion of families experienced persistent anxiety months and years 
after false positives); James R. Sorenson et al., Parental Response to Repeat 
Testing of Infants with ‘False-Positive’ Results in a Newborn Screening 
Program, 73 PEDIATRICS 183, 185–86 (1984). One study also found that about 
half of the children demonstrated difficulty adjusting psychologically to the 
false positives as the mother-child relationship was negatively impacted. Karin 
Fyrö & Göran Bodegård, Difficulties in Psychological Adjustment to a New 
Neonatal Screening Programme, 77 ACTA PAEDIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 226, 
229–31 (1988) (noting, however, that other factors may have played a role in 
the dysfunction, which were unveiled by the NBS results). 
 60. Harrell, supra note 38, at 847–48 (describing the general concern and 
her family’s experience with a false positive when her son was screened as a 
newborn). 
 61. Id. at 847 (discussing the effects of a ten to one ratio of false positives 
to true positives, coupled with a lack of visible symptoms, on parents’ decision 
making, and the fact that false positives create the belief that the child is ill 
and that it is neglectful not to proceed with additional testing). 
 62. See Baily & Murray, supra note 32, at 28–29. 
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justification for the mandatory nature of NBS, as we shall see 
in Part III.B. 
Even more complicated issues arise when laboratories 
make incidental findings of “abnormalities” or clinically 
ambiguous findings.63 This problem has increased with tandem 
mass spectrometry, which looks for a group of core conditions by 
identifying unusually high levels of metabolites related to these 
conditions.64 An artifact of this technology is the incidental 
identification of elevated levels of certain metabolites, which the 
laboratory was not even trying to identify,65 or the identification 
of screening values that lie outside the normal range but that 
do not always clearly correlate with defined disease 
categories.66 These findings can lead to a new kind of diagnostic 
odyssey, where children become, to use the terminology of 
Timmermans and Buchbinder, “patients-in-waiting,” who hover 
“for extended periods of time under medical attention between 
sickness and health, or more precisely, between pathology and 
an undistinguished state of ‘normality.’”67 
Several problems arise when these incidental or 
diagnostically uncertain findings are made and reported to 
                                                          
 63. TIMMERMANS & BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 12 (“Newborn screening 
is a technology expected to provide actionable knowledge, yet it generates 
uncertainty in the clinic . . . .”). 
 64. Baily & Murray, supra note 32, at 25 (“Tandem mass spectrometry 
measures the levels of various metabolites in the blood, and abnormalities in 
the levels suggest the presence of metabolic disorders.”). 
 65. TIMMERMANS & BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 104 (describing the 
identification of ACADM variants of unknown significance). Indeed, one of the 
debated aspects of MS/MS is how many of the metabolic variants to report to 
families. The ACMG proposed that in addition to a core panel of twenty-nine 
conditions identified through MS/MS, twenty-five others should be disclosed to 
families. See supra note 49. Some countries report only a limited number of 
conditions identifiable through MS/MS. Clayton, supra note 11, at 697 (“Many 
countries have chosen to report only a limited number of disorders detectable 
by MS/MS . . . .”). The argument for this approach is that, if the family knows 
about these conditions, they might avoid diagnostic odysseys. In addition, such 
information might be useful for reproductive decision making, and following 
such children might help us deepen our understanding of these conditions. 
These arguments, however, depart from the traditional NBS philosophy by 
placing societal benefits above the needs of the child. Baily & Murray, supra 
note 32, at 28. On the other hand, not everyone wants such information and 
there can be harm in receiving ambiguous information or information about 
conditions for which there is no treatment. See Clayton, supra note 11, at 698 
(“Some parents simply will not want all these results.”). 
 66. TIMMERMANS & BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 65. 
 67. Id. 
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parents. The child might be stigmatized as a “sick child” before 
symptoms develop, if they ever will. This label has been shown 
to have a harmful effect on the parent-child relationship and on 
the family as a whole.68 Indeed, in some cases, the child might 
never become clinically affected by the abnormal levels of the 
metabolite or the mutation.69 There may be a considerable time 
lag before physicians can determine whether high metabolites 
or certain mutations are clinically significant, hence the phrase 
“patients-in-waiting.”  
Timmermans and Buchbinder’s ethnographic study of a 
genetics clinic describes the complexities and anxieties that 
such diagnostic uncertainties present and the ways in which 
entire families are affected during this period.70 If families learn 
of these findings, they might embark on treatment odysseys, 
investing significant money and time in search of treatments 
that may not exist or that are unproven. Sometimes the 
heightened vigilance that parents exhibit during this period is 
difficult to “tone down” once it becomes clear that the child is 
not clinically affected.71 NBS programs may also spend added 
dollars to report and follow up on conditions for which 
treatments may not exist. It has also presented challenges for 
clinicians who have to contend with the fact that expanded 
screening has “identified more patients than anticipated,” most 
of whom are asymptomatic, and which requires a collective 
                                                          
 68. See supra note 59. 
 69. In fact, with little knowledge of the disease’s natural history, it is 
difficult to know the rate of false positives or negatives or even, at times, to 
determine whether there is a false positive or negative. 
 70. TIMMERMANS & BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 65–96 (describing the 
full experience of “patients-in-waiting” and their families). 
 71. Id. at 88 (“When, after time passed, the baby remained fine, clinicians 
sometimes had trouble getting the parents to tone down their level of 
vigilance.”); id. at 91 (“[W]hile geneticists could be ready to let the condition 
fade away, family members could nevertheless perpetuate the medicalization 
of their child.”); id. at 226 (“The most striking emotion we observed in the clinic 
was anxiety, but parents also expressed shame, anger, and sadness.”). Even so, 
“nearly all of the families in [Timmermans and Buchbinder’s] study regarded 
the screening program favorably.” As one parent said, “[w]e would rather go 
through 10 weeks of the hell we went through than a lifetime of having a 
special needs child without having the opportunity to know from day one or 
day five.” Id. at 219. 
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learning process and the development of new knowledge to 
determine who is truly affected.72 
If NBS ultimately includes whole genome sequencing, 
similar issues will arise on an even greater scale. We are 
unlikely to fully understand for some time the clinical 
implications of many mutations, let alone the complex 
interactions of different mutations within a particular genome 
and environment. In many instances, it will be difficult to 
determine whether a genetic variant is likely to have a 
significant clinical impact, or what the degree or timing of such 
impact would be.73 As a result, whole genome sequencing would 
likely provide a great deal of data of limited value, which could 
increase parental anxiety and confusion. 
Although the raison d’etre for NBS was to promote the 
wellbeing of newborns, some of the expansions of NBS can only 
be justified by other considerations, such as allowing parents to 
make better informed reproductive decisions and benefiting 
society by allowing us to better understand the conditions. The 
more these other rationales are used to justify expansions of 
NBS, the more we should question whether screening infants 
without the consent of parents can be justified. I turn now to an 
explanation for the enduring lack of consent in NBS before 
discussing the issues of consent that arise with respect to the 
storage and dissemination of newborn samples for research and 
other uses. 
II. THE LACK OF CONSENT IN NBS 
Consent has long been absent in NBS, making it in essence 
a mandatory screening program. Recently, the public and 
scholarly communities have focused largely on the lack of 
consent with respect to the storage and future uses of DBS. But 
although the lack of consent with respect to the collection of 
blood samples and screening itself has not been challenged as 
strongly, there are reasons to question the presumption against 
requiring consent for NBS itself. I begin by describing the 
general rationales for lack of consent in NBS and then turn to 
the practices with respect to storage and future uses before 
                                                          
 72. Id. at 94–95; see id. at 119 (“[E]xpanded newborn screening has 
prompted a tremendous knowledge explosion about rare metabolic 
conditions.”). 
 73. Clayton, supra note 11, at 698. 
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offering my recommendations, in Part III, regarding consent in 
these two areas. 
A. CONSENT (OR LACK THEREOF) FOR NEWBORN SCREENING 
ITSELF 
NBS is quite unusual in being one of the few areas where 
the state can require medical testing of an individual or child 
without affirmative consent.74 Even so, the mandatory nature of 
NBS has long been well accepted with only minimal criticism.75 
Although most states do not require affirmative parental 
consent for newborn screening, there is some variability with 
respect to what amounts to presumed consent. The majority of 
states allow parents to opt out, although the reasons they allow 
differ. Some will only allow parents to refuse for religious 
reasons.76 Many will allow parents to opt out for any reason.77 
At one extreme, NBS is mandatory without exception.78 One 
state actually imposes criminal penalties for refusing to 
undergo NBS.79 Even in states where there is an opt-out 
provision, there is serious doubt as to whether parents truly 
have an opportunity to refuse in these jurisdictions,80 making 
                                                          
 74. Parents are generally allowed to refuse medical treatment or testing 
on behalf of their child, unless their decision puts a child at grave risk. See 
Andrews, supra note 2, at 59 (“Only when their decisions put their children at 
grave risk are parental decisions overridden by the state.”). 
 75. See, e.g., Clayton, supra note 11, at 697 (discussing the rapid 
development of the screening programs and stating that they “were almost 
always mandatory, in response to advocacy by geneticists and parents”). 
 76. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-5-403 (2013) (allowing parents to opt out of 
testing or medical treatment if they file a written statement that states such 
tests or treatment conflict with their “religious tenets and practices”); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 253.13(3) (West 2010) (stating that the statute shall not apply “if 
the parents or legal guardian of the child object thereto on the grounds that the 
test conflicts with their religious tenets and practices”). 
 77. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 383.14(4) (West 2007) (“The provisions of 
this section shall not apply when the parent or guardian of the child objects 
thereto.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1-6(A) (West 2011) (stating that parents, after 
being informed of the reasons for the tests, may waive the requirements for the 
tests in writing). 
 78. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5431 (West 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§§ 50-19-201 to -211 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-519 to -524 (2009); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-24-17 to -25 (2011); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-22-1 to -6 (2010). 
 79. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-37-30(G) (1991). 
 80. Ruth Faden et al., A Survey to Evaluate Parental Consent as Public 
Policy for Neonatal Screening, 72 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1347, 1347 (1982) 
(describing the screening as “compulsory for all practical purposes”). 
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the provision “opt-out” more in name than practice. Only two 
states require affirmative parental consent.81 
Not only is a requirement of consent for NBS rare, but 
parents are often woefully uninformed about NBS. Often states 
provide limited information about the nature of NBS testing82 
or that there is an option to opt out (when there is such an 
option).83 Sometimes parents are not even informed that the 
child will be tested.84 If a child tests positive through NBS, 
parents often do not learn that the newborn screening results 
are not diagnostic and that there may be false positives or 
negatives.85 And many are not adequately educated about the 
nature of the condition or offered genetic counseling, even when 
the child tests positive.86 
                                                          
 81. D.C. CODE §§ 7-831 to -840 (LexisNexis 2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-
4-801 to -802 (2013). In the last few years, Maryland switched from its opt-in, 
informed consent approach, to an opt-out approach. See MD. CODE REGS. 
10.52.12.07 (2013); Rachel L. Schweers, Newborn Screening Programs: How Do 
We Best Protect Privacy Rights While Ensuring Optimal Newborn Health?, 61 
DEPAUL L. REV. 869, 891 n.130 (2012). The rationale for this change was to 
bring testing in line with the national Newborn Screening Taskforce, to be like 
the vast majority of states, and to lighten the paperwork burden on hospitals 
and providers because parental refusal is so rare. MD. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
MENTAL HYGIENE, 2008 LEGISLATIVE REPORT: SHOULD A COORDINATED 
STATEWIDE SYSTEM FOR SCREENING NEWBORN INFANTS BE APPLIED TO ALL 
NEWBORN INFANTS IN MARYLAND? 2–3 (2008). 
 82. See Schweers, supra note 81, at 869 (discussing the lack of knowledge 
about screening policies amongst health care providers, and the need to initiate 
a discussion in order to address concerns). 
 83. See, e.g., MD. CODE REGS. 10.52.12.07 (2013) (providing an example of 
an opt-out regulation); Rachel Grob, Parenting in the Genomic Age: The ‘Cursed 
Blessing’ of Newborn Screening, 25 NEW GENETICS & SOC’Y 159, 159, 163 
(2006). 
 84. AGR, supra note 8, at 67 (stating that at this point, most parents 
receive brochures or some general information at the time of screening, 
although in many cases this is very thin, token information); see Terry C. Davis 
et al., Recommendations for Effective Newborn Screening Communication: 
Results of Focus Groups with Parents, Providers, and Experts, 117 PEDIATRICS 
S326 (Supp. May 2006) (providing that one-third of patients in a study in 
California never received NBS materials from their prenatal providers even 
though California requires them to provide patients with such information); 
Lisa A. Faulkner et al., The Newborn Screening Educational Gap: What 
Prenatal Care Providers Do Compared with What Is Expected, 194 AM. J. 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 131 (2006). 
 85. AGR, supra note 8, at 65, 67. 
 86. See Clayton, supra note 11, at 697 (“While some people may value this 
information, other parents who specifically chose not to have carrier screening 
for themselves may be less pleased when they involuntarily learn their carrier 
status from their child’s newborn screen.”). 
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NBS laws and practices go very much against legal and 
ethical norms in the United States, which recognize an 
individual’s right to choose whether to undergo medical 
treatment or testing and to refuse treatment even when it can 
result in death.87 Not only is consent required for most medical 
interventions and treatments,88 generally consent must be 
informed.89 
There is considerable irony in the fact that parental 
decision making and education are so limited with NBS since it 
is essentially a form of genetic screening. Mandatory genetic 
testing is extremely unusual,90 in large part because a strong 
consensus has existed for some time that genetic screening 
programs should not be compulsory and should involve 
informed consent.91 After all, genetics and especially genetic 
counseling are among the disciplines in medicine most deeply 
committed to individual autonomy in medical decision making 
and informed decision making for genetic testing.92 
                                                          
 87. The Supreme Court, in Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 
269–70 (1990), discussed the long common law tradition of protecting bodily 
integrity through battery actions and the informed consent doctrine, which is 
now “firmly entrenched in American tort law.” Based on this common law 
tradition, the court inferred that a competent person has a constitutionally 
protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition. See Winston v. 
Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 753, 766 (1985) (holding the surgical removal of a bullet 
from a defendant’s body was an unreasonable search violating the Fourth 
Amendment); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172–73 (1952) (holding that 
evidence obtained through the forceful use of a stomach pump violated the Due 
Process Clause). 
 88. Treating a patient or imposing some medical intervention without a 
patient’s consent could easily be the basis for a battery claim. BARRY R. 
FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 357–58 (5th 
ed. 2004). 
 89. Id. at 357. 
 90. Andrews, supra note 2, at 58 (providing that some unfortunate 
exceptions to this rule have included the mandatory testing for carriers of the 
gene for sickle cell anemia); see AGR, supra note 8, at 40–42. 
 91. Faden et al., supra note 80, at 1347–48 (describing various policy 
committees that have expressly rejected “public health justification[s] for 
mandatory [genetic] screening” and noting that “[t]he Genetic Disease Title of 
Public Law 94-278, which provides assistance in the establishment of genetic 
testing and counseling programs, requires that the ‘participation by an 
individual in any program or portion thereof under this part shall be wholly 
voluntary’”). 
 92. See TIMMERMANS & BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 19 (noting how 
inconceivable it seems in “an era infused with bioethical concern about patient 
autonomy and genetic discrimination” to screen “the overwhelming majority of 
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NBS is not, however, the only example in which the state 
has made medical decisions on behalf of individuals. The state 
has intervened either to protect the well-being of the public or 
the individual himself. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, for 
example, the Supreme Court upheld the state’s right to 
mandate its citizens to be vaccinated against smallpox.93 The 
Court reasoned that vaccinating an individual against his will 
did not violate the individual’s liberty interests.94 This was so 
because a “community has a right to protect itself against an 
epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its 
members,”95 as long as the means of doing so are “reasonably 
required for the safety of the public.”96 The court located the 
state’s right to compel vaccination within its police powers 
because it protects the public health97 by preventing the spread 
of highly contagious smallpox.98 The state has also exercised its 
police powers to impose medical treatment against a person’s 
will when someone has been deemed mentally ill and a threat to 
others.99 In both instances, the government intervenes to 
prevent one individual from threatening physical danger or 
harm to another.100 In spite of possessing these potentially 
broad powers, the states have tended to be fairly limited in 
using them.101 
                                                          
infants . . . for genetic conditions without informed consent”); Suter, supra note 
50, at 242–43. 
 93. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38–39 (1905). 
 94. Id. at 27. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 28. 
 97. Id. at 24–25 (“The authority of the State to enact this statute is to be 
referred to what is commonly called the police power—a power which the State 
did not surrender when becoming a member of the Union under the 
Constitution. [T]his court . . . has distinctly recognized the authority of a State 
to enact quarantine laws and ‘health laws of every description;’ . . . . According 
to settled principles, the police power of a State must be held to embrace, at 
least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactment 
as will protect the public health and the public safety.”). 
 98. Id. at 35 (finding “strong support” for the view that vaccination is an 
effective “means of protecting a community against smallpox”). 
 99. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 236 (1990). 
 100. Ellen Wright Clayton, Screening and Treatment of Newborns, 29 
HOUS. L. REV. 85, 126 (noting that the police power “has historically been 
invoked only to protect others from physical harm”). 
 101. Andrews, supra note 2, at 54 (noting, for example, that the government 
has not tended to track people down with infectious diseases, quarantined 
them, or forced them to undergo treatment, but observing that in some limited 
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The mandatory nature of NBS has been justified by these 
police powers because NBS is touted as a public health effort.102 
In fact, however, NBS does not neatly fit into this model. NBS 
screening is conducted primarily to prevent harm to the 
individual who is being screened, rather than to prevent harms 
to others.103 To be sure, identifying a child’s metabolic disorder 
in time to provide treatment can minimize suffering for the 
family overall, reduce societal health care costs, and expand 
families’ reproductive options. These rationales, however, are 
not typically what we think of as public health efforts of the sort 
that justifies the police powers. Of course, if we conceive of the 
public health more broadly as the public good, then this 
justification is more powerful. 
Even so, the better rationale for the mandatory nature of 
NBS is the doctrine of parens patriae, which allows the state to 
limit a person’s liberty to protect the individual.104 The basic 
principle of this doctrine is to preserve human life.105 Although 
there is a common law and constitutional presumption that 
parents have the right to make medical decisions on behalf of 
their children,106 the state can intervene if parental decisions 
constitute abuse or neglect.107 Classic cases in which the state 
                                                          
cases people have been required to be tested to HIV infection if convicted of 
certain crimes). 
 102. Faden et al., supra note 80, at 1347. 
 103. Whelan, supra note 18, at 435 (describing the police powers as 
infringing “on individual rights primarily to protect the public from other 
individuals’ actions or behaviors”). 
 104. STEVEN OLSON & ADAM C. BERGER, INST. OF MED., CHALLENGES AND 
OPPORTUNITIES IN USING RESIDUAL NEWBORN SCREENING SAMPLES FOR 
TRANSLATIONAL RESEARCH: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 7 (2010) (“Newborn 
screening programs are authorized through the legal doctrine known as parens 
patriae, which gives the state the right to assume certain roles of parents 
based on benefits to the child and to society as a whole.”); Clayton, supra note 
100, at 126. 
 105. Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Del. 1991). 
 106. Id. at 1115–16 (“[T]he common law recognizes that the only party 
capable of authorizing medical treatment for a minor in ‘normal’ circumstances 
is usually his parent or guardian.”); e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 
753 (1982); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). 
 107. Newmark, 588 A.2d at 1116 (“[T]he State can intervene in the parent-
child relationship where the health and safety of the child and the public at 
large are in jeopardy.”); BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE 
LAW AND ETHICS (6th ed. 2008); Lainie F. Ross, Predictive Genetic Testing of 
Children and the Role of the Best Interest Standard, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
899, 901 (2013) (noting that in the United States, as compared with the United 
Kingdom, the best interest standard tends to give “‘considerable deference to 
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has successfully intervened include parental decisions to 
withhold lifesaving transfusions or chemotherapy.108 
The parens patriae justification for NBS is the urgent need 
for early diagnosis of conditions for which early treatment can 
reduce morbidity and mortality. It is further supported by the 
fact that the risks of testing and treatment are generally 
minimal. Thus, the argument goes, the state must intervene 
because parental refusal to test for various inborn errors of 
metabolism and other serious conditions could be potentially 
life threatening or seriously debilitating by preventing an 
affected child from being diagnosed during the newborn period. 
The underlying presumption is that without a mandate, parents 
will refuse to participate in NBS, leaving children undiagnosed 
and therefore untreated for treatable conditions.109 Because 
NBS fits better within a medical model—where the focus is the 
risk/benefit calculus with respect to the individual—than a 
public health model, the parens patriae justification is more 
appropriate than the police powers rationale. 
Even so, as some scholars pointed out in the earlier years of 
NBS, and as is even truer now as NBS expands, the parens 
patriae rationale is somewhat questionable for many reasons. 
First, as I discuss in Part III, empirical data challenge the 
presumption that a mandate is necessary to ensure that 
newborns are screened. Second, definitive treatments are not 
available for all of the conditions identified;110 a problem that 
                                                          
childrearing decisions made by parents or guardians, with state intervention 
generally confined to instances of abuse or neglect’”) (citing Lainie F. Ross et 
al., Technical Report: Ethical and Policy Issues in Genetic Testing and 
Screening of Children, 15 GENETICS MED. 234, 236 (2013)); June Carbone, 
Legal Applications of the “Best Interest of the Child” Standard: Judicial 
Rationalization or a Measure of Institutional Competence 10 (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) (noting that, although “the treatment of 
children starts with deference toward parental preferences” parental rights 
“are not absolute”). 
 108. Andrews, supra note 2, at 59; Seema Shah, Does Research with 
Children Violate the Best Interests Standard? An Empirical and Conceptual 
Analysis, 8 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 121, 125, 156 (2013) (finding that courts 
ordered blood transfusions over parental objections in all but two cases). 
 109. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN 
MED. & BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH, A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, SOCIAL, AND 
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENETIC SCREENING, COUNSELING, AND EDUCATION 
PROGRAMS (1983), available at http://kie.georgetown.edu/nrcbl/documents/
pcemr/geneticscreening.pdf. 
 110. See TIMMERMANS & BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 183 (describing how 
the genetics clinic saw many “symptomatic patients who did not seem to 
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will likely grow as the panel of diseases expands. Third, in some 
cases interventions can save lives, but the children still “face 
significant developmental delays, frequent hospitalizations, and 
serious risks of mortality.”111 Sometimes, newborn screening 
may not occur in time to protect those at greatest risk.112 Given 
the ongoing morbidity and mortality for many children screened 
positive, some scholars predict that “the health payoff of 
screening is likely to be lower than the number of true positive 
might otherwise imply.”113 
Even when treatments are available, the state often does 
not actually provide treatment to the affected children; the 
programs merely provide families with the information to seek 
out treatment.114 The success of newborn screening in 
preventing disease depends largely on day-to-day efforts to 
manage the conditions and “the ability [of families] to tap into 
available medical services and social resources,” which is as 
much a function of socioeconomic factors as anything else.115 As 
                                                          
improve” and how “for the most severe disorders associated with the worst 
outcomes . . . newborn screening [is] unlikely to make a difference in 
outcomes”); Clayton, supra note 11, at 698 (“Other disorders are identified for 
which there is no effective therapy.”). 
 111. TIMMERMANS & BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 179; id. at 184 (“[S]ome 
children did poorly despite the advance knowledge provided by newborn 
screening.”); id. at 189 (describing conditions for which early interventions 
“could prevent only some negative consequences”). 
 112. Id. at 162 (“[B]etween July 2005 and April 2009, 62 screen positive 
infants died in California before follow-up care could be started in a metabolic 
center.”); id. at 180 (“In some cases, newborn screening results arrived too late, 
after a child had already sustained a devastating metabolic crisis and 
permanent brain damage.”). 
 113. Id. at 216. 
 114. See Burke et al., supra note 8, at 152 (“Although most states provide 
informational brochures, many parents are unaware that their infant has been 
tested unless they are notified of a positive result.”); see also R. Rodney Howell, 
We Need Expanded Newborn Screening, 117 PEDIATRICS 1800, 1802 (2006) 
(“The facilities vary widely for such follow-up around the country, and it is 
incumbent on the state programs to work in their regions to provide follow-up 
support in terms of funding and organization.”). In such cases, we may simply 
be labeling more children as ill without actually providing much clinical benefit 
to many of these children, especially if parents are not adequately educated or 
cannot afford the treatment. Moreover, it exacerbates concerns about whether 
the resources devoted to NBS could be better used to address the urgent health 
care needs of many children that have still not been met. 
 115. TIMMERMANS & BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 195; see id. at 170, 194–
210 (describing the effects of insurance, access to transportation, language, 
education and bureaucratic barriers on parents’ abilities to manage their 
children’s metabolic conditions). 
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a result, the state’s efforts work only partially toward the goal 
of eliminating the deleterious effects of the diseases, leading 
some to question whether the true motivation for mandatory 
NBS is actually the well-being of the child.116 
Finally, even if the state is motivated primarily by the well-
being of each child, it is not clear that the risks are great 
enough to justify state intervention. While many of the NBS 
conditions could lead to grave, even life-threatening, harm if 
undetected, these conditions are extremely rare. This means 
that the probability that any one child who is not tested 
through NBS will suffer a grave or life-threatening illness by 
failing to undergo NBS is statistically quite low, although 
clearly the magnitude of harm could be quite great.117 In 
contrast, both the probability and magnitude of harm (death or 
serious debilitation) in failing to provide blood transfusions or 
chemotherapy, for example, will often be considerable.118 As 
Professor Lori Andrews has noted, the risks of refusing NBS 
screening “is far less than the risks inherent in many other 
decisions that parents are routinely allowed to make,” such as 
allowing their children to play on high school sports teams.119 
Moreover, the probability of false positives is quite high; the 
rate of false to true positives can be as high as, or higher than, 
ten to one.120 As noted above, false positives are often not 
inconsequential. They can potentially lead to psychological, 
                                                          
 116. See Burke et al., supra note 8, at 151 (“However, growing test capacity 
has led to calls to expand not only the number of disorders screened for but 
also the goals of newborn screening.”). “In the past, . . . infrastructural 
problems and healthcare costs had tempered enthusiasm for expanding 
newborn screening, but the separation of the scientific issues from those 
affecting healthcare delivery had the effect of decontextualizing the viability of 
screening.” TIMMERMANS & BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 55. 
 117. NBSTF, supra note 28, at 414. 
 118. Andrews, supra note 2, at 60. Of course, the calculus can often be 
complicated by other factors. In Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108 (Del. 
1991), for example, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that it was not 
neglectful for parents to refuse chemotherapy treatment for their three-year-
old child, who suffered from “an aggressive and advanced form of pediatric 
cancer,” because the proposed treatment was “highly invasive, painful, 
involved terrible temporary and potentially permanent side effects, posed an 
unacceptably low chance of success, and a high risk that the treatment itself 
would cause his death.” Id. at 1109–10, 1118. 
 119. Andrews, supra note 2, at 60. 
 120. See Harrell, supra note 38, at 847 (“Given such real life consequences 
of a false positive and that the rate of false positives to true positives is as high 
as 10 to 1 (or higher) for many of the newborn screens . . . .”). 
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relational, and even physical harms from follow-up testing 
and/or treatment.121 While the magnitude of such harms is 
lower than failing to detect the condition, the probability of such 
harms is likely much greater than the probability of identifying 
the conditions screened for. 
Despite these concerns and a general presumption against 
compulsory genetic screening in virtually every other context, 
mandatory NBS remains the norm, even when opportunities 
arise to change the nature of this institution.122 As I argue in 
Part III, it may be time to rethink the role of consent in NBS, 
particularly with the potential of NBS to expand even further 
and as NBS samples are used more widely in research, as the 
next section shows. In addition, consent requirements may go 
far in promoting the NBS education that parents, providers, 
and scholars believe is woefully inadequate.123 
B.  STORAGE AND SECONDARY USES OF NBS SAMPLES 
Once the newborn blood spots are analyzed for the various 
NBS conditions, residual blood remains in the form of DBS.124 
Increasingly, states retain these samples for future uses, 
although the retention time varies significantly from state to 
state. Some states have provisions to retain samples for only 
one to four weeks, some for months, some for years, some for 
decades, and others indefinitely.125 Often these samples are 
stored with identifying information.126 
                                                          
 121. See id. at 847–48. 
 122. MICH. COMM’N ON GENETIC PRIVACY & PROGRESS, FINAL REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 4, 33 (1999). This Author was a member of the Michigan 
Commission on Genetic Privacy and Progress. Despite many months of 
deliberation, a majority of the committee voted to retain mandatory NBS, with 
an opt-out provision, although efforts were made to ensure that parents were 
to receive information about NBS. 
 123. Sandra J. Carnahan, Biobanking Newborn Bloodspots for Genetic 
Research Without Consent, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 299, 303, 322–25 
(2011) (“Although educational pamphlets about the screening program are 
typically distributed to the parent, guardian, or managing 
conservator . . . state statutes, almost universally, do not require NBS 
programs to obtain the informed consent of the newborn’s parent prior to 
extracting the blood sample.”). 
 124. Id. at 301. 
 125. See Michelle H. Lewis et al., State Laws Regarding the Retention and 
Use of Residual Newborn Screening Samples, 127 PEDIATRICS 703, 704 (2011) 
(“A total of 40% of state public health laboratories have reported retaining DBS 
for at least 1 year.”); Richard S. Olney et al., Storage and Use of Residual Dried 
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Although the samples are analyzed right away for NBS, 
there are several reasons states might want to retain the 
samples for months or even years. Many of these reasons are 
related to the underlying purpose of NBS. For example, the 
retention of these samples—along with contact information—is 
necessary for follow-up and to ensure that there will be 
appropriate intervention for an affected child.127 In addition, 
labs may need to perform repeat tests to make a confirmatory 
diagnosis or to reassure families if there is a false positive.128 
Less directly related to NBS testing per se, but still connected 
to the public health aspects of NBS, is the retention of blood 
spots for quality assurance testing and to monitor the 
prevalence of various conditions in the state.129 NBS samples 
may also be helpful for post-mortem diagnosis; for example, 
when trying to establish whether a genetic condition was 
related to a child’s death.130 
Increasingly, states are interested in long-term retention of 
these blood spots for purposes not directly related to NBS. Some 
states and/or other countries retain neonate blood spots for non-
medical or non-research uses, such as identification in 
kidnappings or deaths.131 NBS samples have also been used for 
paternity testing132 and could potentially be used for the 
identification of criminals.133 
                                                          
Blood Spots from State Newborn Screening Programs, 148 J. PEDIATRICS 618, 
619 fig. (2006). 
 126. Carnahan, supra note 123, at 320 (observing that a 2002 study found 
that thirty-four out of thirty-six NBS program studies stored the DBS with 
identifying information). 
 127. Id. at 304. 
 128. NBSTF, supra note 28, at 414. 
 129. Id. at 404, 413, 415–16 (suggesting that knowing about the prevalence 
of various conditions is important not only for better understanding of the 
condition, but also for determining the optimal allocation of resources). 
 130. Linda Kharaboyan et al., Storing Newborn Blood Spots: Modern 
Controversies, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 741, 742 (2004).  
 131. MICH. COMM’N ON GENETIC PRIVACY & PROGRESS, supra note 122, at 
28. 
 132. In New Zealand, the High Court ordered the Auckland Health Services 
to provide the blood sample of a man’s child for paternity testing that he 
sought after the baby died. H v G [M/1686/98] 1999, upheld in H v G (1999) 18 
FRNZ 572 (HC). 
 133. Some have called for universal DNA databanking for criminal forensic 
purposes. See, e.g., D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Databases for Law 
Enforcement: The Coverage Question and the Case for a Population-Wide 
Database, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE TECHNOLOGY OF 
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In addition, these blood spots, like most pathology samples, 
are a treasure trove for researchers because they are a valuable 
national repository of genetic material. As genetic technology 
develops,134 the blood spots are an especially rich source of 
research material: they are stable over time, they constitute an 
unbiased collection of samples since they represent the entire 
population,135 and they can potentially be linked to basic 
demographic information.136 As one author notes, “[n]ewborn 
screening initially began as a population health endeavor but is 
rapidly becoming a resource for population research.”137 
Newborn blood samples have been used in research and shared 
with investigators since the 1980s,138 sometimes with 
identifying information.139 
Only recently have professional groups begun to consider 
seriously how to handle the problems of storage and secondary 
uses of the samples.140 Very few states have specific regulations 
                                                          
JUSTICE 247, 269–71 (David Lazer ed., 2004) (arguing that universal DNA 
databases would eliminate the disproportionate minority representation in 
forensic databases). NBS blood spots would offer an easy way to achieve this 
goal. 
 134. “Optimal storage conditions” for these samples are less crucial for 
genetic analysis than for other kinds of biochemical analysis. NBSTF, supra 
note 28, at 415. 
 135. Nanette Elster, Future Uses of Residual Newborn Blood Spots: Legal 
and Ethical Considerations, 45 JURIMETRICS 179, 180 (2005); Kharaboyan et 
al., supra note 130, at 745. 
 136. NBSTF, supra note 28, at 415 (noting, however, that because these 
bloodspots “will not be linked to clinical data on the children” their “potential 
utility . . . will need to be carefully evaluated”). 
 137. Elster, supra note 135, at 189. 
 138. See Innocent Blood: Use of Newborn Heel Sticks Spurs Legal 
Challenges, IRB ADVISOR (AHC Media, Atlanta, Ga.), Dec. 1, 2009 [hereinafter 
Innocent Blood] (noting that many states used them to determine things like 
the prevalence of HIV infections, prenatal exposure to heavy metals, 
frequencies of certain genes); Michelle Lore, Is the Minnesota Department of 
Health Violating Privacy Laws, MINN. LAW., Nov. 30, 2009 (stating that since 
the end of 2008, 52,519 NBS samples from the state of Minnesota had been 
used for research). 
 139. Elizabeth Cohen, The Government Has Your Baby’s DNA, CNN (Feb. 4, 
2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/HEALTH/02/04/baby.dna.government/ (noting 
that a study in Minnesota found that “more than 20 scientific papers have been 
published in the United States since 2000 using newborn blood samples”). 
 140. NBSTF, supra note 28, at 389 (recommending that each state develop 
and implement policies for retention of residual DBS, educate parents 
regarding the storage and uses, and develop model consent forms and 
information materials for parents); Brad Therrell et al., Briefing Paper: 
Considerations and Recommendations for a National Policy Regarding the 
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governing what kind of future uses the samples may be put to 
or requiring that parents be notified of or give consent for such 
uses.141 North Dakota, for example, does not require specific 
consent, stores the samples indefinitely, and permits the use of 
samples for “‘medical, psychological or sociological research.’”142 
Indeed, because many parents do not realize that their child 
has been screened for various diseases, they are unaware of the 
possibility that a blood sample from their newborn may be 
stored in state health departments for potentially long periods 
of time and possibly shared with others for uses unrelated to 
NBS.143 
The laws in a few states are an exception to this rule. In 
May of 2009, while the first Texas lawsuit challenging the 
state’s practice of storing and using newborn samples for 
undisclosed research was pending,144 the Texas Legislature 
amended its NBS laws to require parents and guardians to be 
informed that samples were being collected and would be stored 
indefinitely for potential research purposes.145 Parents, or 
children upon reaching adulthood, can now request to have the 
                                                          
Retention and Use of Dried Blood Spot Specimens After Newborn Screening, 
RESOURCE REPOSITORY (Aug. 26, 2009), http://resourcerepository.org/
documents/1681/briefingpaper:considerationsandrecommendationsforanational
policyregardingtheretentionanduseofdriedbloodspotspecimensafternewborns/; 
see APHL Position/Policy Statement: Residual Newborn Screening (NBS) 
Specimens, APHL (2005), http://www.aphl.org/policy/Documents/residual_
newborn_screening_specimens.pdf (suggesting that retention of DBS is 
important for laboratory quality assurance practices and can also be useful for 
research among other things); see also AM. COLL. OF MED. GENETICS, 
STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL GENETIC LABORATORIES (2008) 
(finding it critical, if states do not retain DBS, for parents to have the option to 
have their children’s DBS included in a national repository). 
 141. Lewis et al., supra note 125, at 703, 705, 707 (providing that “thirteen 
states specify the purposes for which DBS may be used,” eight states require 
parents to be notified of the retention of DBS, and three require “parents to be 
informed” so that they can request destruction of the DBS). The United States 
is not the only country where samples are also stored for long periods of time. 
See Kharaboyan et al., supra note 130, at 742–43 (describing practices in 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom). 
 142. Whelan, supra note 18, at 428. 
 143. See generally TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 33.0111–.0112 
(West 2010) (showing the ability of a state to carry out such activities with 
DBS). 
 144. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 145. See Higgins v. Tex. Dep’t of Health Servs., 801 F. Supp. 2d 541, 544–45 
(W.D. Tex. 2011). 
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samples destroyed within sixty days146—essentially an opt-out-
of-research approach. The lawsuit was settled once the State of 
Texas agreed to destroy over five million coded newborn 
samples,147 which had been stored indefinitely for possible 
research without parental consent.148 
Minnesota also has a limited opt-out provision, allowing 
parents to refuse NBS itself or to request the destruction of test 
results and samples following screening.149 Even so, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court ruled in favor of parents who sued 
the state for storing and authorizing public health research on 
newborn samples on the grounds that these practices violated 
Minnesota’s genetic privacy law.150 Although the court 
construed the NBS statutes to be “an express exception to the 
Genetic Privacy Act,” the storage, dissemination, and use of the 
samples were not expressly authorized and therefore violated 
the privacy statute.151 As a result of this decision, NBS samples 
in Minnesota were not available for research or public health 
studies. Recently, however, the Minnesota House of 
Representatives and the Minnesota Senate passed bills that 
would change this.  If these bills become law, NBS samples 
would be available for research, unless parents or the child, 
                                                          
 146. Id. at 545. 
 147. Mary Ann Roser, Samples of Newborns’ Blood to Be Destroyed, AUSTIN 
AM. STATESMAN, Dec. 23, 2009, at A1 (providing that the state decided that 
trying to seek consent from all of those parents was a worse option than simply 
destroying all of the samples). The samples were not identifiable, but because 
they are coded, a link exists that could be used to identify the child. Id. 
 148. Cohen, supra note 139 (noting that in other states it may be very 
difficult to convince the state to destroy your baby’s archived blood sample). A 
class action filed late 2010 in Texas, also alleging that the state had stored 
DBS for the purposes of undisclosed research, was dismissed as moot because 
there was no evidence that the parties’ newborn samples were actually used or 
distributed for research. Higgins, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 545, 554. 
 149. MINN. STAT. § 144.125 (2012); Lore, supra note 138 (explaining that 
absent parents opting out, the NBS test results may become public health 
data). In Minnesota, for example, the department of health has a contract with 
the Mayo Clinic for analysis of NBS samples, which allows the Clinic to “keep 
the samples indefinitely if there is no request for their destruction.” Id. The 
samples are not identifiable, although they are coded, and therefore could 
potentially be linked to the individual. Kharaboyan et al., supra note 130, at 
744. 
 150. MINN. STAT. § 13.386 (2013); Bearder v. Minnesota, 806 N.W. 2d 766, 
776 (Minn. 2011); Lore, supra note 138 (stating that Minnesota has been 
storing the samples since 1997); Innocent Blood, supra note 138. 
 151. Bearder, 806 N.W. 2d at 776. 
2014] CONSENT IN NEWBORN SCREENING 759 
 
over the age of eighteen, opt out, which they may do at any 
time.152 
Oklahoma and Michigan require more than the right to opt 
out. The Oklahoma Legislature recently enacted a provision 
that requires “express parental consent” for storage, 
dissemination, and use of a newborn’s DNA.153 Michigan, after 
seeking input from researchers, ethicists, community groups, 
and the state health department’s institutional review board, 
created a specific repository for future research that would 
require affirmative, informed consent from parents.154 This 
approach keeps the research uses of newborn samples separate 
and distinct from NBS itself, which remains mandatory.155 
As these lawsuits and this legislation suggest, many 
secondary uses of DBS raise ethical and even legal concerns, 
particularly when the uses are not related to the purposes for 
which the samples were originally collected.156 Particularly 
salient are the threats to privacy and confidentiality.157 In 
addition, questions of autonomy and research ethics come into 
play because the newborns potentially become research subjects 
via their Guthrie cards.158 Contemporary practices with NBS 
raise pressing questions as to whether consent must be secured 
for storage and secondary uses of NBS samples, and if so what 
kind of consent—general consent for research, or specific, 
informed consent for a particular use.159 
                                                          
 152. Minnesota House Passes Newborn Screening Bill, GENOME WEB     
(May 2, 2014), http://www.genomeweb.com/clinical-genomics/minnesota-house-
passes-newborn-screening-bill. 
 153. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1175 (West 2012). 
 154. Innocent Blood, supra note 138; see also Denise Chrysler et al., The 
Michigan BioTrust for Health: Using Dried Bloodspots for Research to Benefit 
the Community While Respecting the Individual, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 98, 
98–99 (2011) (discussing the creation of Michigan’s Neonatal Biobank). 
 155. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5431 (West 2001). 
 156. Innocent Blood, supra note 138. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id.; see also AGR, supra note 8, at 65 (discussing Guthrie cards). 
 159. These issues also tap into a longstanding debate about ownership and 
control over one’s biological material, an issue on which we still have no clear 
consensus. Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward a 
Deeper Understanding of Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 803–11 
(2004); see C. Thomas, The Use and Control of Heel Prick Blood Samples, 24 
MED. & L. 259, 261–68 (2005) (applying various theories of property ownership 
to NBS samples). 
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An important consideration in evaluating the propriety of 
the long-term storage and future uses of NBS samples is 
whether the samples are identifiable; that is to say, whether 
they can be linked directly to the newborn through identifying 
information or indirectly through a code. NBS blood spots must, 
of course, be identifiable initially so labs can locate and offer 
follow-up testing to children with abnormal results. But 
researchers try to anonymize previously identifiable samples by 
unlinking them from their source.160 While some of the possible 
future uses of newborn samples require the samples to be 
identifiable—e.g., post-mortem identification, paternity testing, 
forensics, and future diagnostics—many kinds of research 
samples might potentially be anonymized, although as I note 
below, people are increasingly skeptical about the effectiveness 
of this practice.161 
Current regulations require informed consent for research 
on biospecimens that have already been archived and are 
identifiable or linkable.162 The Federal Protections for Human 
Research Subjects, sometimes called the “Common Rule,”163 
require documented informed consent for participation in 
research.164 Research on identifiable DBS easily falls within the 
definition of human subject research under the regulations, 
which includes analysis of “identifiable private information.”165 
While state NBS programs have “not traditionally been viewed 
as subject” to the Common Rule given that they are regulated 
by state health departments,166 some scholars argue 
convincingly that the federal regulations should apply to 
research on DBS.167 
                                                          
 160. NBSTF, supra note 28, at 416 (noting that they may have been 
originally collected without identifiers or with identifiers that have been 
removed). 
 161. Id. at 416–17; see infra text accompanying note 220. 
 162. Carnahan, supra note 123, at 315. 
 163. Id. Seventeen federal agencies have adopted these protections 
“verbatim.” Id. at 315 n.102. 
 164. 45 C.F.R. § 46.117 (2013); see also Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936. 
 165. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f) (2013) (defining human subject). 
 166. Carnahan, supra note 123, at 315–16. 
 167. Id. at 316–17 (arguing that federal dollars and policy guidance directly 
and indirectly support NBS, including the collection, analysis, and storage of 
“newborn bloodspots for future research purposes”); e.g., Therrell et al., supra 
note 140, at 1, 3. 
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Under the existing regulations, however, research on de-
identified biological samples is generally understood to be 
exempt from federal protections of human subjects research.168 
Indeed, the Office of Human Research Protections does not 
“consider research involving only coded private information or 
specimens to involve human subjects . . . if . . . the private 
information or specimens were not collected specifically for the 
currently proposed research project . . . and the investigator(s) 
cannot readily ascertain the identity to the individual(s) to 
whom the coded private information or specimens pertain.”169 
One scholar argues that this exemption does not apply to DBS 
because they were collected not only as part of a screening 
program, but also as part of a “research program.”170 While 
sympathetic to the view that the exemption should not apply, I 
am not persuaded that these samples would be treated 
differently from any other biospecimens under the research 
regulations because these samples were not collected with any 
specific research protocol in mind. 
The question of whether and how research should be 
allowed on NBS or other biosamples reflects tensions between 
public and private interests, and more specifically between 
norms that focus on the value of research and norms that focus 
on individual rights, autonomy, and privacy interests.171 
                                                          
 168. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) (2013) (exempting from the research 
regulations research “involving the collection or study of existing 
data . . . pathological specimens, or diagnostic specimens, if these sources are 
publicly available or if the information is recorded by the investigator in such a 
manner that subjects cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers 
linked to the subjects”). 
 169. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., OHRP - Guidance on Research 
Involving Coded Private Information or Biological Specimens (2008), available 
at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/cdebiol.html. This interpretation clearly 
seems to view research on biobanks with coded samples as not involving 
human subjects research, even though “[t]he increase in genomic data, as well 
as the increase of computerization of other records about individuals, will only 
make identifying ‘anonymous’ biobank files easier and easier.” Henry T. 
Greely, The Uneasy Ethical and Legal Underpinnings of Large-Scale Genomic 
Biobanks, 8 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 343, 352–55 (2007). 
 170. Carnahan, supra note 123, at 320 (observing that “one purpose” of the 
collection and storage of the DBS “is for future genetic research”). 
 171. Storage of Genetics Materials Comm., Am. Coll. of Med. Genetics, 
ACMG Statement: Statement on Storage and Use of Genetic Materials, 57 AM. 
J. HUM. GENETICS 1499 (1995). This issue creates tension between the ethical 
principle of informed consent, which argues in favor of recontacting individuals 
to obtain their consent, and the serious impracticabilities of doing so. 
762 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 15:2 
 
Similar tensions about autonomy interests versus some 
conception of the public good arise with respect to the question 
of whether consent should be required for NBS itself.172 In 
trying to determine how best to resolve these tensions, Part III 
sets up a framework for balancing the conflicting interests and 
applies this approach to the specific questions of whether some 
form of consent should be required for: 1) the storage and 
research uses of NBS samples; and 2) some or all aspects of 
NBS itself. 
III. BALANCING THE INTERESTS 
In exploring the tensions between the public good and the 
individual’s privacy and autonomy interests, we can see how 
biases can influence the weight of the interests.173 As we shall 
see below, those who strongly promote research and its benefits 
to newborns and society tend to undervalue the privacy and 
autonomy interests at stake. Similarly, the strong proponents of 
privacy and autonomy tend to undervalue the public value of 
the long-term retention and research use of DBS. As a result, 
they reach an impasse, not only because they value things 
differently, but also because their approaches differ. 
Many proponents of expansive access to NBS samples and 
other archived tissues “tend to rely on a narrow version of 
consequentialism” to justify a broad range of research practices, 
while minimizing the privacy and autonomy interests at 
stake.174 The benefits of this approach seem “concrete and 
tangible”175: preventing morbidity and mortality in newborns, 
and gaining knowledge about various inherited disorders to 
advance medicine and clinical care.176 The risks of broader 
access to NBS samples—privacy intrusions and the loss of 
autonomy interests—“are more amorphous concerns and are 
therefore less viscerally compelling.”177 Indeed, many of the 
public benefit proponents easily dismiss the value of autonomy 
                                                          
 172. See Suter, supra note 50, at 246–50 (discussing value considerations in 
prenatal testing). 
 173. Sonia M. Suter, All in the Family: Privacy and DNA Familial 
Searching, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 309, 375–76 (2010) [hereinafter Suter, AITF] 
(discussing a parallel trend with DNA familial searches). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Carnahan, supra note 123, at 300. 
 177. Suter, AITF, supra note 173, at 375. 
2014] CONSENT IN NEWBORN SCREENING 763 
 
and privacy, and informed consent.178 This view argues for 
expansive NBS with mandatory testing, long-term retention of 
samples, and broad access to these samples by researchers 
without consent. 
In contrast, a position that privileges privacy and autonomy 
would push toward requiring detailed informed consent for all 
aspects of NBS: the collection of samples, the subsequent 
analysis, the retention of samples, the manner in which they 
are stored (coded, identifiable, or anonymized), access to the 
samples, and uses to which the samples are put.179 This 
approach would limit many of the potential research benefits 
that have come from NBS programs and use of the samples.180 
Clearly neither extreme fully considers all that is at stake. 
As a result, I recommend an approach that “does not focus 
exclusively on one or just a few values or desirable 
consequences. Instead, it recognizes the competing goods at 
stake.”181 Because I have described this approach in more detail 
in an earlier piece, I will only briefly outline the methodology, 
which borrows from philosopher W.D. Ross.182 The central 
premise is that we have various underlying prima facie duties, 
which may sometimes come into conflict.183 We have, for 
example, prima facie duties to protect the public by supporting 
and encouraging research and identifying children with 
treatable conditions in a timely manner to minimize morbidity 
and mortality. We also have prima facie duties to protect the 
autonomy of the family and the future autonomy of the 
newborns with respect to medical decision making and 
participation in research, and duties to protect the privacy of 
newborns. None of these duties is absolute in the sense that 
they must always override conflicting duties.184 Instead, all of 
these duties are “intrinsically binding”—they hold sway over us, 
but “they are not always determinative of how we should act in 
                                                          
 178. Id. at 376. 
 179. Carnahan, supra note 123, at 322–25. 
 180. Id. at 322 (noting that informed consent is problematic because future 
research methods are unknowable). 
 181. Suter, AITF, supra note 173, at 376. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 376–77. 
 184. Id. at 377. 
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any given instance . . . . Instead we can only determine what 
our actual duty is in any circumstance by full reflection.”185 
This approach does not attempt to declare winners and 
losers when competing values come into play. Rather, it 
attempts to reach a resolution that may ultimately tip more in 
the direction of one duty than the other, but which continues to 
recognize the pull of the competing values.186 That is to say, 
when we determine what the actual duty is in any particular 
circumstance, we should not abandon or forget about the 
overridden prima facie obligations, because they continue to 
“exert force on our subsequent attitudes and actions”187 and 
leave “residual effects” or “moral traces.”188 If our full reflection 
leads us to decide that certain research goals are particularly 
important to society, we may decide to limit autonomy to some 
extent to allow for that research. The pull of our duty to protect 
individual autonomy, however, continues to compel us to 
“approximate as closely as possible the values enshrined in the 
overridden duty” so that we develop measures that least 
infringe on parental autonomy.189 
Considering whether consent should be required in NBS 
forces us to make difficult choices between various competing 
values and find ways to give weight, as much as possible, to the 
overridden prima facie duties. In particular, we must apply this 
balancing approach to decide: 1) what kind of consent 
provisions, if any, we should use for NBS itself; and 2) whether 
                                                          
 185. Id. I note in this piece that “this methodology does not offer conclusive 
answers to most moral questions.” Id. at 378. It is, nevertheless, not arbitrary 
or subjective. Rather, it requires a kind of “reflective equilibrium” where we 
“check decisions from general principles against more intuitive judgments 
about proper outcomes for particular cases.” Id. at 379. See generally JOHN 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 15–19, 40–47 (rev. ed. 1999) (describing the 
“reflective equilibrium”). 
 186. Suter, AITF, supra note 173, at 378. 
 187. Id. 
 188. JAMES F. CHILDRESS, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN CONFLICTS: ESSAYS 
ON NONVIOLENCE, WAR, AND CONSCIENCE 69 (1982) (citing Robert Nozick, 
Moral Complications and Moral Structures, 13 NAT. L.F. 1 (1968)); RICHARD B. 
MILLER, CASUISTRY AND MODERN ETHICS: A POETICS OF PRACTICAL 
REASONING 47 (1996); Suter, AITF, supra note 173, at 376 (“[O]verridden 
values remain significant and continue to exert force and obligations on our 
actions and deliberations. In other words, the overridden values do not go 
away; they retain ‘moral traces.’”). 
 189. MILLER, supra note 188, at 47. 
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consent should be required, and if so what kind, for the storage 
and future uses of the samples. 
I should emphasize that the issue of consent for NBS itself 
and consent for storage and future uses need not be treated as a 
package. Indeed, there are strong arguments for separating the 
process of screening from the process of the creation of 
biobanks, as I suggest below, and therefore completely 
disaggregating the questions of consent. At the moment, 
however, affirmative consent is generally removed from the 
entire process. When we disaggregate the two sets of 
decisions—whether to participate in NBS and whether to 
participate in the biobank—it becomes clear that the conflicting 
public/private values are very different. With respect to NBS 
itself, at least when the conditions screened for develop in 
infancy and are treatable or subject to amelioration, the conflict 
is between the state’s interest in the well-being of the newborn 
and the autonomy of the family. With respect to questions of 
storage and, in particular, research uses of the samples, the 
public value of research comes into conflict with the private 
values of the families’ autonomy interests and the newborn’s 
privacy and future autonomy interests. Because each set of 
questions raises different tensions, I address each issue in turn. 
I begin with the research question because it has received the 
most attention recently and because it indirectly has 
implications for the question of consent for NBS itself. 
A. RETENTION AND RESEARCH USES OF DBS   
In only a few other contexts does the government take one’s 
tissue samples without consent and retain them for extended 
periods of time: after conviction of certain crimes,190 and in the 
military.191 In the first instance, the conviction results in the 
loss of certain liberty interests.192 And in the case of the 
military, one has a choice not to join the military. But in the 
context of NBS, samples are usually taken without parental 
consent and then stored for long periods, potentially to be used 
                                                          
 190. Bonnie L. Taylor, Comment, Storing DNA Samples of Non-Convicted 
Persons & the Debate over DNA Database Expansion, 20 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 
509, 512–14 (2003). 
 191. Megan Allyse et al., Ethics Watch: The G.I. Genome: Ethical 
Implications of Genome Sequencing in the Military, 12 NATURE REVIEWS 
GENETICS 589 (2011). 
 192. Taylor, supra note 190, at 514. 
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for research, an approach that “veers from the norm.”193 As 
noted, the justifications for doing so in the case of NBS are 
rooted in a perspective that emphasizes the value of research 
and that views archived samples as something akin to 
community property.194 Some also argue that the public interest 
and value of research are not just communal interests, but also 
individual interests because everyone benefits from the 
research.195 
Even if we value research, however, we must recognize the 
competing interests in autonomy and privacy in being able to 
decide whether and to what extent to participate in research 
and to control access to personal information. Privacy advocates 
point out the dignitary interests, sometimes suggesting that 
biosamples belong to the individual.196 Serious privacy concerns 
arise when others have access to our genetic material, which 
contains “a wealth of personal information such as 
predisposition to certain diseases, behaviors, physical and 
mental traits, parentage, and genetic relatedness to others.”197 
The fact that the DBS contains genetic information and is likely 
to be “readily identifiable” leads some to say that consent is 
                                                          
 193. Cohen, supra note 139. 
 194. See David Korn, Genetic Privacy, Medical Information Privacy, and the 
Use of Human Tissue Specimens in Research, in GENETIC TESTING AND THE 
USE OF INFORMATION 16, 53 (Clarisa Long ed., 1999) (arguing that archived 
human tissues are “a public resource dedicated to the public good, not, like a 
savings bank, a depository of private property”); see also Rebecca Skloot, 
Taking the Least of You, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2006, at M45 (“[P]eople are 
morally obligated to allow their bits and pieces to be used to advance 
knowledge to help others. Since everybody benefits, everybody can accept the 
small risks of having their tissue scraps used in research.” (quoting David 
Korn, supra)). 
 195. Korn, supra note 194, at 60; Karen Rothenberg, The Social 
Implications of the Use of Stored Tissue Samples: Context, Control, and 
Community, in GENETIC TESTING AND THE USE OF INFORMATION 84, 85–88 
(Clarisa Long ed., 1999) (suggesting that both privacy and research are public 
and private interests); see also Lisa Feuchtbaum et al., Questioning the Need 
for Informed Consent: A Case Study of California’s Experience with a Pilot 
Newborn Screening Research Project, 2 J. EMPIRICAL RES. ON HUM. RES. 
ETHICS 3, 3 (2007) (“[T]he legitimate needs of society and the interests of 
newborns should not be sacrificed to respond to the autonomy interests of the 
few parents who did not wish their infant to participate in the study . . . .”). 
 196. Andrews, supra note 2, at 63. 
 197. Suter, AITF, supra note 173, at 331. 
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required whether or not the samples are “linked or linkable.”198 
Because this information is “fundamental and basic to our 
makeup” and plays such “an important, though not monolithic, 
role in influencing our ‘temperament, health, capacities, and 
physical appearance,’”199 legislators at the state and federal 
level have enacted various forms of genetic privacy protections 
in the last few decades.200 I, like many others, have argued that 
genetic information is “integral to the self,” and therefore is 
among the kinds of personal information in which we have 
strong privacy interests.201 
Proponents of consent provisions for research on 
biosamples are also motivated by a commitment to principles of 
autonomy; the notion that individuals may not be treated as 
merely a means to an end.202 Indeed, these ethical principles 
have led not only to formal declarations about the various ways 
in which researchers have an ethical obligation to protect 
research subjects, but also to legal regulations protecting the 
way in which research may and may not be conducted in the 
United States.203 Among the most fundamental principles of 
these ethical and legal norms are informed consent and the idea 
that the researchers have a fiduciary obligation to protect 
research subjects. A decision to become a participant in 
research either to advance medicine or to benefit others and/or 
oneself is a self-defining decision. It also creates a relationship 
of trust because it involves sharing personal information with 
researchers, imposing on them “special duties of care because of 
the imbalance of power inherent in the relationship.”204 
The degree to which we emphasize our duties to promote 
research or to protect autonomy and privacy will determine our 
                                                          
 198. Katherine Drabiak-Syed, Legal Regulation of Banking Newborn Blood 
Spots for Research: How Bearder and Beleno Resolved the Question of Consent, 
11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 13 (2011). 
 199. Suter, AITF, supra note 173, at 332. 
 200. See, e.g., Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), 
Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881; Genetic Privacy Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14287 (last updated 
Jan. 2008) (describing the full range of state genetic privacy laws). 
 201. Suter, supra note 159, at 773. I have also noted that “genetic 
information is not uniquely, nor is all genetic information equally, central to 
the conception of the self.” Suter, AITF, supra note 173, at 334. 
 202. FURROW ET AL., supra note 107, at 405. 
 203. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.301–.306 (2013) (otherwise known as the “Common 
Rule”). 
 204. Suter, supra note 159, at 787. 
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approach to research on DBS. Under the extreme pro-research 
position, samples should be available in any form for use by 
researchers for any kind of investigation. Such an approach 
would seriously undermine the privacy interests of the child 
and autonomy interests of the family. It would allow the use of 
the newborn samples in identifiable form, which would privilege 
research over privacy and autonomy. Not surprisingly, this 
approach is inconsistent with the well-established consensus 
that under the Common Rule, identifiable samples cannot be 
used for research without one’s informed consent.205 The 
Common Rule recognizes that the value of research, while real, 
is not absolute and therefore cannot override autonomy at all 
costs.206 
At the other, pro-privacy/autonomy extreme, any future use 
of the samples for research would require detailed informed 
consent whether the samples were identifiable, coded, or 
anonymized, regardless of the uses. This approach would 
privilege privacy and autonomy interests over the value to the 
public of various research studies, potentially hindering 
research. It would be extremely difficult (if not impossible) and 
expensive to implement since it would require researchers to 
locate families to seek their consent for virtually every future 
study. Moreover, meaningful informed consent is often 
impossible to obtain when biospecimens, whether DBS or other 
forms, are initially collected because the parents or sources of 
the samples cannot be informed of all possible research uses 
and outcomes. In some ways, it might even be counter-
productive to privacy interests since it would require the 
samples to remain identifiable while in long-term storage for 
the purpose of contacting the families. 
The current system and recommended approach of some 
scholars and professional groups might be considered a 
compromise of sorts; informed consent is required if the samples 
are identifiable, but otherwise consent is not required for 
                                                          
 205. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101(b)(4), 46.111(a)(4) (2013). 
 206. There are many methodologically sound and highly valuable types of 
research that we do not allow because values like privacy, autonomy, and the 
mental and physical well-being of individuals would make such studies 
unethical. The unfortunate history of human subject research in Nazi Germany 
and even in this country has taught us important lessons about the limits to 
which we can endanger others and limit their autonomy simply to further 
science. FURROW ET AL., supra note 107, at 405–13. 
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anonymized or de-identified samples.207 The theory, in brief, is 
that the privacy risks are substantially minimized once 
identifiers are removed. To the extent that no samples are ever 
truly anonymized, however, this argument becomes less 
persuasive. In addition, as some have pointed out, even under 
this system, sometimes researchers actually use biospecimens 
with identifiers, rather than in anonymized form, without 
obtaining consent or Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
approval.208 
Regardless of whether we consider the current system 
appropriate for biobanks in general, we must recognize that 
NBS biobanks are unique in implicating particularly salient 
privacy and autonomy interests. First, parents often have not 
given consent to (or are even aware of) the collection of the 
biospecimen and NBS in the first place, let alone the long-term 
storage and potential research on the specimens. Indeed, one 
study showed that only twelve states mention specimen storage 
in the informational pamphlet that parents receive for NBS.209 
With other biobanks, it is likely that the source of the specimen 
consented to (and knew about) the removal of the sample from 
his or her body (whether or not consent was given for later uses 
of the sample). 
Second, these samples are obtained from minors and 
therefore any research on these samples is research on children, 
who are treated under the Common Rule as a vulnerable class 
deserving of heightened protection.210 While minors can 
participate in research, there are very limited instances in 
                                                          
 207. Amy L. McGuire & Laura M. Beskow, Informed Consent in Genomics 
and Genetic Research, 11 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 361, 370 
(2010). 
 208. Drabiak-Syed, supra note 198, at 43. When the plaintiff in the Bearder 
litigation requested documentation from the Minnesota Department of Health 
(MDH) regarding its process of de-identification of samples for research, the 
MDH stated that it had no such documents, suggesting that “there is no 
established de-identification procedure and that the process and standards 
vary from project to project and are subject to subjective standards.” Whelan, 
supra note 18, at 441 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 209. SEC’YS ADVISORY COMM. ON HERITABLE DISORDERS IN NEWBORNS & 
CHILDREN, CONSIDERATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NATIONAL 
GUIDANCE REGARDING THE RETENTION AND USE OF RESIDUAL DRIED BLOOD 
SPOT SPECIMENS AFTER NEWBORN SCREENING 16 (2009) [hereinafter 
ACHDNC] (citing personal communication with Aaron Goldenberg). 
 210. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.401–.409 (2013) (describing “Additional Protections 
for Children Involved as Research Subjects”). 
770 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 15:2 
 
which consent for participation is not required. For example, 
even the least problematic category of research on children—
“[r]esearch not involving greater than minimal risk”—still 
requires the child’s assent and parental consent,211 unless the 
general waiver provisions for informed consent apply.212 
Scholars have debated whether the waiver provisions should 
apply in this context.213 The crux of the matter turns on 
whether informed consent is practicable or not. As one scholar 
notes, even when researchers do not have to obtain informed 
consent under the regulations, they often do, demonstrating 
that it is not always impracticable.214 When children are 
involved and their biospecimens are retained for long periods of 
time, there is a strong argument that they should have the right 
(upon reaching the age of majority) to decide for themselves 
whether they want to be research participants.215 
Third, as I shall argue in more detail below, the state, as 
protector of the newborn and as mandator of the collection of 
the DBS, has a fiduciary obligation to protect the autonomy and 
privacy interests of the newborn with respect to the collection, 
retention, and use of the samples. For all of these reasons, 
whatever concerns we may have about the use of biobanks 
without consent (informed or general) are further heightened in 
this context. 
                                                          
 211. 45 C.F.R. § 46.404. 
 212. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(d) (2013) (waiving informed consent requirements 
when the research “involves no more than minimal risk to the subjects . . . [t]he 
waiver or alteration will not adversely affect the rights and welfare of the 
subjects . . . [t]he research could not practicably be carried out without the 
waiver or alteration,” and when appropriate, “the subjects will be provided 
with additional pertinent information after participation”). 
 213. Compare ACHDNC, supra note 209, at 19 (“A balanced consideration 
of concerns justifies waiving informed consent for population-based newborn 
screening research using de-identified specimens when a clinically well-defined 
test and an effective therapy are present.”), with Carnahan, supra note 123, at 
320–21 (challenging the notion that informed consent would be “impracticable” 
because “a physician-patient relationship already exists between the physician 
and the mother-to-be, and it is typically the physician that is responsible for 
obtaining the bloodspot for screening and research”), and Drabiak-Syed, supra 
note 198, at 38 (suggesting that waiver has “been used as a creative 
mechanism to overcome administrative barriers”). 
 214. Ellen Wright Clayton, Patients and Biobanks, 51 VILL. L. REV. 793, 
796–97 (2006). 
 215. David Gurwitz et al., Children and Population Biobanks, 325 SCI. 818, 
818 (2009). 
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As a result, we should not weigh the interest in favor of 
research as strongly in this context as we might with respect to 
other types of biobanks. Indeed, this strongly supports the view 
that we should prohibit the use of DBS for any research.216 
While this would certainly limit the privacy and autonomy risks 
for the newborn and his or her family, to the extent that this 
population offers unique possibilities for research, one might 
argue that such a proposal goes too far. It is undoubtedly true 
that much of the research done on DBS need not be done on 
that particular population. But some forms of research may 
benefit substantially by collecting data from a pool, like the 
NBS samples, which represents the population so well. In 
addition, to the extent that any clinical data are combined with 
research on the DBS, research from birth through later life 
might offer unique insights into various disease processes that 
would be harder to obtain with other populations. Given that 
research of these samples poses heightened concerns, however, 
if any research on DBS should be allowed, it should be limited 
to research that benefits the pediatric population. Michigan’s 
approach, for example, recognizes the importance of using 
newborn samples only for research that is relevant to the 
pediatric community.217 
To the extent that any research goes forward on DBS, for 
all of the reasons described above, it is appropriate to give 
families (and the child upon reaching the age of majority) some 
control over whether the DBS are archived for research 
purposes. Consistent with current requirements for research on 
biospecimens, informed consent should be obtained for research 
on identifiable NBS samples generally (except in the rare 
instances where a waiver could apply). 
Under the current interpretations of the Common Rule, 
however, affirmative consent would not be required for de-
identified samples,218 which is problematic in the NBS context. 
As biobanks generally become more prevalent and central to 
genomics research, scholars have debated whether this 
approach is ethically justifiable, not just with respect to NBS, 
but for all biobanks. Scholars have argued that “a person has an 
                                                          
 216. Hank Greely has argued that there is simply no reason for researchers 
to utilize DBS when there are other biorepositories to use. Author’s personal 
communication. 
 217. Chrysler et al., supra note 154, at 99. 
 218. McGuire & Beskow, supra note 207, at 370. 
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interest in consenting or not consenting to be part of research,” 
even if it includes analysis of biospecimens.219 Growing concerns 
about the inability to truly anonymize biological samples220 
have led to further calls to rethink the current approach toward 
research on biospecimens.221 Indeed, in response to advances “in 
genetic and information technologies that make complete de-
identification of biospecimens impossible,” the Department of 
Health and Human Services proposed changes to the consent 
requirements for research on biospecimens.222 Specifically, the 
proposed changes would eliminate the ability to do research on 
de-identified biological samples without consent. Instead, it 
would require “written general consent” for research use of 
archival biospecimens, whether or not researchers ultimately 
decide to use identifiers.223 The intended general written 
consent would allow individuals “to say no to all future 
research,” and give them the option to say yes or no to “a 
handful of special categories of research with biospecimens” 
that might raise “unique concerns . . . for a significant segment 
of the public.”224 In addition, the proposed changes would allow 
                                                          
 219. See, e.g., Greely, supra note 169, at 356. 
 220. See, e.g., id. at 351–52; Melissa Gymrek et al., Identifying Personal 
Genomes by Surname Inference, 339 SCI. 321, 321 (2013); Nils Homer et al., 
Resolving Individuals Contributing Trace Amounts of DNA to Highly Complex 
Mixtures Using High-Density SNP Genotyping Microarrays, 4 PUB. LIBR. SCI. 
GENETICS, Aug. 29, 2008, at 1–2; Zhen Lin et al., Genomic Research and 
Human Subject Privacy, 305 SCI. 183, 183 (2004); Amy L. McGuire & Richard 
A. Gibbs, No Longer De-Identified, 312 SCI. 370, 370–71 (2006); Laura L. 
Rodriguez et al., The Complexities of Genomic Identifiability, 339 SCI. 275, 
275–76 (2013). 
 221. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, Harnessing the Benefits of Biobanks, 33 J.L. 
MED & ETHICS 22, 24 (2005); Carnahan, supra note 123, at 320. 
 222. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for 
Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for 
Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,512, 44,525 (proposed July 26, 2011) (to be 
codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 46, 160, 164). These were part of a broader proposed 
overhaul of the “Common Rule.” Id. at 44,514. 
 223. Id. at 44,519 (emphasis added). The proposed regulations would move 
away from the concept of “exempt research” and create a new category of 
“excused research” that is intended both to “increase protections”—by 
requiring general consent as opposed to no consent for all biospecimens (as well 
as for pre-existing data collected for research, whether or not the researcher 
uses identifiers, and for pre-existing data that were collected for purposes other 
than research, if the researcher uses identifiers)—“and broaden the types of 
studies covered,” by allowing researchers to use identified biospecimens as long 
as they had general consent. Id. at 44,518–19. 
 224. Id. at 44,519–20 (giving as examples the creation of cell lines or 
reproductive research). 
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for waivers in some (unspecified) instances.225 Although these 
proposed regulations have not been adopted so far, they reflect 
an attempt to balance the pressures to promote research and 
protect individual privacy and autonomy.226 
Following a modified version of the proposed amendments 
to the regulations for human subjects research, states should 
ask for general consent for the storage of DBS for future 
research uses of de-identified DBS.227 Parents would be entitled 
to say no to all future research, yes to all future research, or no 
to a handful of specific categories of research that might be 
problematic.228 In addition, children, upon reaching the age of 
majority, should be able to refuse consent for research or for 
particular categories of research.229 
The focus on general, as opposed to detailed informed, 
consent serves two functions. It attempts to give parents (and 
the future adult the newborn will become) some autonomy 
protections while recognizing the value of research.230 It 
concedes the pro-research view that fully informed consent in 
this context truly is problematic; at the time the samples are 
collected, there may not be any specific plans for research, let 
alone for specific research protocols.231 Thus, it is simply 
impossible to inform parents about the details of possible future 
research. In addition, the circumstances in which the samples 
are collected—during the newborn period—do not easily lend 
themselves to the lengthy discussions that informed consent 
                                                          
 225. The advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM), however, notes 
that the waivers “would not necessarily be the same as those for other types of 
research.” Id. at 44,520. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 44,519. I call this a modified version because the ANPRM would 
require general consent for both the use of identified and identifiable samples. 
In my view, as long as informed consent is required for identifiable samples in 
other contexts, there is no argument for affording NBS biobanks less protection 
than other biobanks. Moreover, the rationale for using samples in this form 
would likely be to follow clinical outcomes, which itself would require 
considerable efforts to contact families or physicians to obtain clinical 
information. 
 228. Id. at 44,518–20. 
 229. Id. at 44,524. 
 230. Feuchtbaum et al., supra note 195, at 8–9 (discussing parental 
autonomy protections). 
 231. Elster, supra note 135, at 187–88. 
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would require, even if the specific future research protocols 
were known.232 
Of course, if we were to separate the NBS process from the 
collection of samples for research, then this removes many of 
the challenges of obtaining consent during the newborn period. 
Such an approach might be justified by the concerns that the 
research is not in any one newborn’s best interest, but instead 
serves the public good.233 As a result, we should eliminate any 
pressure to consent to research that might occur during the 
newborn period, especially if parents do not fully understand 
that the question of screening is not conceptually or practically 
linked to whether or not research is done. 
But disaggregating consent for screening from consent for 
research does not eliminate the general problem of obtaining 
fully informed consent for research on pathology samples, given 
the impossibility of knowing about all future research 
endeavors in advance. Moreover, such disaggregation 
potentially removes one of the benefits of collecting DBS during 
the newborn period—the potential of collecting samples that 
represent the population. The challenges of tracking down 
families after that period would undoubtedly diminish the yield 
of samples available for research, potentially even more than 
the process of trying to obtain more complete informed consent. 
A lesser, but real, concern is that families that wanted to 
support such research but were not tracked down would lose out 
on the chance to consent to research. Of course, seeking consent 
for retention of samples for research in the prenatal period 
might lessen these concerns, although this would not be helpful 
in cases where women do not receive prenatal care.234 Thus, 
while some powerful reasons argue for separating consent for 
research from consent for NBS, we should recognize that such 
an approach is not without costs. 
At whatever stage the consent process occurs for research 
on DBS, I am advocating what is essentially an opt-in approach 
for future research. Undoubtedly, even this approach would be 
less favorable to the research community than being able to 
access de-identified samples without any consent requirement, 
                                                          
 232. Id. 
 233. Drabiak-Syed, supra note 198, at 36–38 (focusing on the benefit of the 
majority). 
 234. Whelan, supra note 18, at 452 (noting that not all women receive 
prenatal care). 
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because surely the latter approach would maximize the number 
of available samples. As a second choice, they would likely 
prefer opt-out to opt-in provisions under the theory that they 
are likely to have a larger pool of samples if parents must act 
affirmatively to prevent the storage of the samples, as opposed 
to requiring parents’ affirmative consent for storage and future 
research.235 One consideration in choosing opt-in versus opt-out 
approaches is what the legislative default goals are. If the 
incentives are to promote research, the “nudging” of an opt-out 
approach may be viewed as making it more likely that such 
samples are available.236 But given the many concerns 
surrounding research on DBS, it is hard to argue we should be 
trying to “nudge” families into participating in research. 
In fact, the data so far suggest that it is debatable how 
great the risk is that people would decline participation in 
research. Several studies suggest that a large percentage of 
parents would consent to participate in research.237 A 2008 
study, for example, found that 90% of mothers would agree to 
participate in an NBS biobank with no restrictions on the type 
of research performed.238 Another study found that 76.2% of 
parents were “very or somewhat willing” to permit storage of 
and research on DBS, whereas if consent were not obtained, 
only 28.2% would be “very or somewhat willing” to allow the use 
of DBS for research.239 On the other hand, Texas’s limited 
experience with opt-out provisions suggests that it had some, 
though not a significant, effect on the size of the newborn pool. 
In a roughly six-month period, 240,000 samples were collected 
                                                          
 235. Innocent Blood, supra note 138 (explaining how any samples moving 
forward require consent as part of the opt-in program). 
 236. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 83–86 (2008) (noting the 
importance of the default position for opt-out v. opt-in rules). 
 237. E.g., Feuchtbaum et al., supra note 195, at 7–8; Alon B. Neidich et al., 
Empirical Data About Women’s Attitudes Towards a Hypothetical Pediatric 
Biobank, 146A AM. J. MED. GENETICS 297, 299 (2008); B.A. Tarini et al., Not 
Without My Permission: Parents’ Willingness to Permit Use of Newborn 
Screening Samples for Research, 13 PUB. HEALTH GENOMICS 125, 130 (2010). 
 238. Neidich et al., supra note 237, at 302; see also Feuchtbaum et al., supra 
note 195, at 7 (stating that although not all parents were asked to participate 
in a study of NBS because of the burdens on the hospital, ninety percent of 
those asked consented to enroll their NBS in the study to research NBS testing 
methods and to identify additional genetic diseases). 
 239. Tarini et al., supra note 237, at 128–29 (finding that women had 
misperceptions about what participation in a biobank would entail). 
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and the state received 6900 requests to destroy samples—a rate 
of 2.8%.240 We do not know how these numbers would compare 
with an opt-in provision or what parents understood about 
storage and possible future uses when they opted out. 
In addition, there are potentially legitimate concerns about 
the possibility of consent bias when parents opt in. Many argue 
that giving people the opportunity to say no would not only 
reduce the pool of biospecimens available for research because 
of “uninformed denial,”241 but would also lead to consent bias in 
the biospecimens that are available.242 Given that the pool of 
newborns is so vast, there may be reason to think that the 
effects of consent bias might be lessened, albeit not completely 
eliminated, by the sheer number of samples potentially 
available. 
Even if evidence shows that the pool of research samples 
might be smaller with an opt-in provision or that there is a 
greater risk of consent bias, this alone is not a reason to reject 
these measures to protect autonomy.243 The entire justification 
for removing consent requirements from NBS generally is the 
notion that the screening program is intended to benefit 
newborns.244 Removing consent for participation in future 
research on DBS cannot be justified on the same grounds.245 
The extent to which the research benefits newborns may vary, 
but even research that is primarily geared toward benefiting 
newborns will provide much more indirect benefits than the 
actual screening for treatable and serious conditions.246 
Research that does not focus on the newborn or pediatric 
population offers even less benefit to newborns and cannot at all 
justify the lack of consent.247 Thus, as noted earlier, any 
                                                          
 240. Roser, supra note 147, at A1. 
 241. Korn, supra note 194, at 48. 
 242. E.g., Barbara J. Evans, Much Ado About Data Ownership, 25 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 69, 95–98 (2011); Kharaboyan et al., supra note 130, at 747. 
 243. Drabiak-Syed, supra note 198, at 36 (noting that the “benefit to the 
majority is not alone a sufficient interest to override individual autonomy”); 
Whelan, supra note 18, at 453 (“As a society, we cannot allow administrative 
costs or burdens to justify infringements on individual rights, parental rights, 
and genetic privacy.”). 
 244. Drabiak-Syed, supra note 198, at 36. 
 245. Innocent Blood, supra note 138. 
 246. Feuchtbaum et al., supra note 195, at 7–9. 
 247. Id. at 11–12. 
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research on DBS should ideally be limited to that which 
benefits the pediatric population. 
One additional concern with the opt-in approach is that 
requiring affirmative consent for retention and research uses of 
DBS will lead some parents to opt out of NBS altogether in 
jurisdictions where that is possible.248 Here, the value of 
providing parental autonomy and the child’s future autonomy is 
set against the potential harms to newborns if severe and 
treatable conditions are not identified in the newborn period.249 
This concern might, therefore, argue for decoupling consent for 
NBS from the consent for research uses of DBS. 
There is a strong argument to be made the other way, 
however. Whether or not the consent process for NBS and 
research are disaggregated, seeking parental consent for future 
research on the DBS helps establish the public’s trust in the 
NBS process generally.250 Recent attention to long-term storage 
and research uses of these samples may lead parents to think of 
NBS, not so much as a program intended to protect the health 
of newborns, but as an effort to create a universal research 
pool.251 This may create push back with respect to NBS 
altogether, causing parents to opt out of NBS to resist what 
they perceive as the heavy hand of government.252 As Dr. 
Jeffery Botkin suggests, denying parents the chance to opt out 
of future research may undermine the public’s trust in the 
entire endeavor.253 Indeed, it is precisely such suspicion and 
loss of trust that led to the lawsuits in Texas and Minnesota.254 
As one parent in the Texas lawsuit explained, “To me, this 
whole thing is about consent . . . . If they had asked me I 
probably would have consented. The fact that it was a secret 
program really made me so suspicious of the true motives, 
there’s no way I would consent now.”255 Thus, as long as any 
research is done on the DBS, whether consent is obtained in the 
future or during the newborn period, the public needs to know 
                                                          
 248. Id. at 11. 
 249. Id. at 8–9. 
 250. Drabiak-Syed, supra note 184, at 12–13, 23, 42. 
 251. Id. at 23, 35–36. 
 252. Id. at 35–36. 
 253. Innocent Blood, supra note 138 (quoting Jeffrey R. Boktin). 
 254. Drabiak-Syed, supra note 198, at 25–34. 
 255. Roser, supra note 147, at A1; see also Whelan, supra note 18, at 442 
(“As one parent succinctly stated: ‘I want to have the choice.’”). 
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that any use of these samples requires affirmative consent from 
parents. The state should not presume consent. 
Not only is the public’s trust important to the sustainability 
of the NBS project as a whole, but trust is also inherent in the 
relationship the state creates between itself and the child in 
setting up NBS. The most persuasive justification for NBS is 
the parens patriae notion that the state steps in to act as parent 
for the child.256 This creates a trust-based, fiduciary 
relationship (which goes beyond the ordinary fiduciary 
obligation the state owes its citizens) given that the state takes 
over some aspects of the child’s care for the well-being of the 
child.257 As a consequence, a strong obligation exists not only to 
ensure that NBS maximizes the well-being of the child, but to 
ensure that any ancillary uses of the samples do not in any way 
undermine the best interests of the child, even for the benefit of 
society as a whole. 
Michigan’s creation of the BioTrust for Health, which is 
intended to facilitate and promote research on the DBS of NBS, 
was modeled on the concept of a charitable trust.258 Under this 
model, the source of the specimen (in this case the parent acting 
on behalf of the child) “formally expresses” the desire to transfer 
the specimen into the control of the trustee (the state) who will 
keep the sample for the benefit of the beneficiary (the general 
public).259 Important to this approach is the notion that the 
transfer is intentional and freely given, and that the recipient of 
biospecimens (in this case the state) “has a responsibility to 
serve as a trustee, or steward, of the tissue to ensure protection 
of the contribution.”260 This model suggests three things: first, 
that parents should consent to the use of their newborn’s 
samples for inclusion in the research biobank; second, that the 
samples are to be used for the benefit of the public; and third, 
and most important, that the recipient has a fiduciary 
obligation not only to develop clear rules about the kinds of uses 
to which these samples can be put, but also to implement 
security measures to protect the confidentiality of the 
                                                          
 256. AGR, supra note 8, at 261. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Chrysler et al., supra note 154, at 98 (citing David J. Winickoff & 
Richard Winickoff, The Charitable Trust as a Model for Genomic Biobanks, 349 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1180, 1180 (2003)). 
 259. Winickoff & Winickoff, supra note 258, at 1182–83. 
 260. Id. at 1182. 
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information in the samples.261 Given the limits of de-
identification and anonymization in protecting privacy,262 it is 
particularly important that the state develop explicit guidelines 
as to the legitimate uses of the samples both in terms of the 
best interests of the newborns and the public and in terms of 
security measures. 
Indeed, the charitable trust model does not require that the 
state hold the DBS. Instead, a non-state charitable trust could 
be created and charged with the obligation of holding the 
samples and ensuring that their use is for the benefit of the 
public. The fact that the state would not possess the DBS and 
that this approach would disentangle the NBS process from the 
research aspects would likely help promote public trust. 
While there are legitimate concerns about the 
impracticabilities of obtaining informed consent about future 
research uses, efforts should be made to inform parents about 
the general nature of the permissible and impermissible uses of 
the samples as well as security provisions. Such efforts would 
not only protect the autonomy interests of the family, but might 
also indirectly promote research. If families believe that the 
government has given careful attention to the kinds of uses that 
it will and will not allow, and has been attentive to the security 
of this personal information, families may be more inclined to 
participate. Otherwise, the public may not trust the state, 
believing, at best, that it has been negligent in protecting 
against problematic uses of the samples or, at worst, that the 
state may have malignant plans for such samples, which is why 
it has not set limits on these future uses. 
B.  CONSENT FOR NBS ITSELF 
A conclusion that parental consent should be required for 
storage and research use of a newborn’s DBS does not 
necessarily mean that consent should also be required for NBS 
itself. In fact, Michigan, whose BioTrust approach for research 
on DBS is commendable, requires written consent for the 
inclusion of the samples in the biobank (and the right of a child 
upon age of majority to have their DBS removed), but it does 
                                                          
 261. See id. at 1182–83 (describing the charitable trust model generally and 
emphasizing the factors asserted in the text). 
 262. Greely, supra note 169, at 352–55. 
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not require consent for the screening.263 Moreover, the balance 
of public and private interests argues less strongly for 
affirmative consent with respect to NBS than in the research 
context since achieving high rates of NBS not only benefits the 
newborn, but also parents and society as a whole.264 Even 
though I concede that the case for consent is less strong in this 
context, the recent and likely future expansions in NBS make 
an increasingly compelling case for rethinking parental consent 
in this context as well.265 
To be sure, there are serious challenges in requiring true 
informed consent for the screening itself. Given the number of 
diseases screened for, obtaining meaningful informed consent of 
the sort that the law demands for a physically invasive and 
risky medical procedure would be virtually impossible for each 
and every condition in the NBS panel.266 The likely expansion of 
the panel of diseases and possibility of whole genome 
sequencing in the future only enhances this problem. Whatever 
challenges conveying this wealth of information presents in 
ordinary circumstances are magnified by the fact that the 
disclosures typically occur during the newborn period, when 
parents are unlikely to be able to process the details of the 
nature of each of these conditions, the various treatment 
options for affected children, and the likelihood each of the 
conditions will manifest symptoms.267 Additional concerns 
surrounding informed consent are the economic and logistical 
                                                          
 263. Chrysler et al., supra note 154, at 100. 
 264. Feuchtbaum et al., supra note 195, at 8–12. 
 265. Even if consent should occur for NBS, however, it does not follow that 
it should occur at the same time as consent for research. Indeed, as noted 
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processes. 
 266. This is a problem generally with any kind of multiplex testing. See, 
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burdens such a requirement would place on health care 
providers and the public health system.268 
How logistically challenging it is to obtain consent for NBS, 
however, is debatable. One much cited pilot study for a new 
NBS technology confirms some of these worries. The research 
study, which required informed consent, found that obtaining 
written informed consent was a “serious logistical burden” for 
the hospitals involved.269 As a result, the researchers only 
achieved forty-seven percent participation in the study.270 On 
the other hand, a study in Germany suggested that much 
higher participation rates could be achieved when written 
consent was sought.271 In that case, almost ninety-nine percent 
of the parents consented to NBS.272 Similarly, an older study of 
Maryland’s previous informed consent approach to NBS found 
“no evidence that the parental consent regulation had a 
negative effect on the public’s health. . . . [or] that the [NBS] 
program had become less cost-effective.”273 The data seems 
mixed as to the burden that seeking informed or written 
consent imposes. 
To say, however, that obtaining true informed consent is 
impossible, results in unacceptably low yields of parental 
consent, or is effective but unduly expensive, does not mean we 
should abandon all efforts to seek any form of parental 
consent.274 An approach that requires affirmative parental 
consent—i.e., an opt-in approach—would offer the next best 
form of respecting parental autonomy. Most states, however, 
have chosen the opt-out approach, which theoretically still 
offers some parental control because it creates the right for 
parents who greatly oppose NBS to decline screening of their 
                                                          
 268. Id. at 156–57. 
 269. Feuchtbaum et al., supra note 195, at 6. 
 270. See id. at 7 (stating that only forty-seven percent of newborns 
participated in the MS/MS screening during the pilot study’s time frame). 
 271. Bernhard Liebl et al., Very High Compliance in an Expanded MS–MS-
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 272. Id. at 127, 130–31. 
 273. Faden et al., supra note 80, at 1351. 
 274. See Ainsley Newson, Should Parental Refusals of Newborn Screening 
Be Respected?, 15 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 135, 140, 144 (2006) 
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newborn.275 In order for an opt-out option to offer any true 
semblance of respecting parental autonomy, however, parents 
must understand that they have an option to opt out, which 
requires some awareness and general understanding of the 
NBS process and the option to opt out.276 Unfortunately, that 
rarely happens.277 This may be because providers fail to inform 
parents, because so much is happening during the newborn 
period that parents cannot absorb or process whatever 
information they might get, or some combination of the two. As 
a result, there is a strong case for NBS education to occur in the 
prenatal period when there is more time for reflection, 
discussion, and comprehension.278 Although, again, this is only 
helpful for women who receive prenatal care. 
Even if education regarding NBS were enhanced by 
requiring NBS education during the prenatal period, there is 
reason to think that an opt-out approach would still be less 
than optimal if the goal is parental education. The incentives 
simply are too few to educate parents under an opt-out as 
compared to an opt-in approach. Under an opt-out approach, the 
default is to test, which creates no incentive to discuss NBS 
with parents.279 Testing will occur with or without such a 
discussion. A statutory requirement to discuss NBS might not 
be a sufficient incentive to educate the families in light of the 
many other demands on health care providers’ time. In 
contrast, under an opt-in approach, the default is not to test 
unless parents consent, which creates strong incentives to 
discuss NBS with parents, even if only in general terms.280 
An additional argument in favor of the opt-in approach, 
given the goal of parental education, is that it is more cost-
                                                          
 275. Feuchtbaum et al., supra note 195, at 9. 
 276. Moody & Choudhry, supra note 9, at 246–48. 
 277. See id. at 240, 244 (noting that parents “are not even aware that they 
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effective than full-blown informed consent would be.281 The 
study of Maryland’s program established, albeit many years 
ago, that parents can be educated adequately about newborn 
screening generally—not with respect to the details of every 
condition—in no more than five minutes.282 Further, there are 
cost-effective methods, such as decision aids, which are being 
developed for a range of medical decisions,283 to provide parents 
with an overview of NBS. Indeed, some have advocated a 
system that would provide basic information about NBS to 
parents with options for access to more detailed information 
should they want it.284 Such an approach would further promote 
autonomy by allowing people to decide how much information to 
receive. 
Were there evidence to suggest that an opt-in approach 
would lead to a great deal of uninformed denial, this might be a 
powerful reason to forgo some protections of parental autonomy 
to prevent (the admittedly small number of) newborns from 
suffering from debilitating or life-threatening illnesses. But 
evidence suggests, as we shall see, that involving parents in the 
decision-making process may actually enhance the effectiveness 
of NBS, and therefore opt-in provisions may further both 
goals—protecting the health of the newborn population and 
promoting parental autonomy.285 
A study conducted over two decades ago showed that the 
refusal rate for NBS is really quite low in the states where NBS 
is truly voluntary.286 It found that Maryland and New 
Hampshire, out of twelve states studied, had the highest 
percentage of NBS: ninety-eight percent of their newborns.287 
                                                          
 281. See id. (“There was also no evidence that the program had become less 
cost-effective because of increased costs to the health care system.”). 
 282. See id. at 1350 (“Most nurses . . . responded that obtaining consent or 
refusal took from one to five minutes.”). 
 283. See, e.g., Elie A. Akl et al., A Decision Aid for COPD Patients 
Considering Inhaled Steroid Therapy: Development and Before and After Pilot 
Testing, BMC MED. INFORMATICS & DECISION MAKING, May 15, 2007, at 1, 4–6 
(discussing the use of decision aids for COPD). 
 284. Harrell, supra note 38, at 849–50. 
 285. Jean-Louis Dhondt, Implementation of Informed Consent for a Cystic 
Fibrosis Newborn Screening Program in France: Low Refusal Rates for 
Optional Testing, 147 J. PEDIATRICS S106, S107–08 (Supp. Sept. 2005); Liebl et 
al., supra note 271, at 130–31. 
 286. Andrews, supra note 2, at 60. 
 287. Id. 
784 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 15:2 
 
Maryland had a program that required informed consent288 (it 
now has an opt-out approach289), and New Hampshire allows 
parents to refuse NBS for any reason.290 In contrast, the other 
ten states, all with mandatory screening programs that allow 
parental refusal only for religious reasons, screened fewer 
newborns. One state managed to screen a mere fifty-eight 
percent of its neonates.291 More recent studies show that 
parental consent is over ninety percent when parents are 
allowed to opt out of screening or even sometimes required to 
consent affirmatively.292 A possible explanation for these data is 
that a voluntary program that informs and educates parents 
about NBS induces parents to ensure actively that their 
children will actually get screened.293 By contrast, mandatory 
programs—especially those in which parents are not well-
educated about NBS—lack this additional “check on the 
procedure,” resulting in a lower yield of children screened.294 
Interestingly, most parents do not believe that informed, or 
sometimes even any, parental consent is necessary for NBS,295 
at least with respect to conditions that present in infancy. On 
first glance, these findings might cut in favor of maintaining the 
status quo. In one study, parents did, however, want choice.296 
Nearly three-quarters of parents preferred opting out and a 
                                                          
 288. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 45. 
 289. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 13-109 (West 2013). 
 290. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132:10-c (2013). 
 291. Andrews, supra note 2, at 60–61. This study did not investigate an 
important question, which is how effective the education efforts are in these, as 
opposed to other, opt-out programs. 
 292. Dhondt, supra note 285, at S106; Liebl et al., supra note 271, at 130–
31; Evelyn P. Parsons et al., Mothers’ Accounts of Screening Newborn Babies in 
Wales (UK), 23 MIDWIFERY 59, 62–63 (2007). 
 293. Liebl et al., supra note 271, at 130–31. One author questions whether 
the “consent” procedures in these voluntary programs are truly informed 
because consent is given at the time of screening. She suggests that parents 
will say yes to anything right after birth, which could result in artificially high 
consent rates and could explain why the voluntary programs have such high 
participation rates. Harrell, supra note 38, at 850. 
 294. Andrews, supra note 2, at 60. 
 295. Elizabeth D. Campbell & Lainie Friedman Ross, Incorporating 
Newborn Screening into Prenatal Care, 190 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 
876, 876–77 (2004); Faden et al., supra note 80, at 1350–51 (stating that forty-
six percent felt that their consent should not be sought); Moody & Choudhry, 
supra note 9, at 246–48. 
 296. Moody & Choudhry, supra note 9, at 244–46. 
2014] CONSENT IN NEWBORN SCREENING 785 
 
little over one-quarter preferred opt-in approaches.297 However, 
when asked about mandatory screening for conditions that do 
not present in infancy, such as Duchenne muscular dystrophy, 
which presents between three and ten years of age, and 
Alzheimer’s disease, which presents in adulthood, a majority of 
parents opposed mandatory screening.298 This may reflect the 
fact that there is little that can be done to prevent these 
conditions from developing in the newborn period or at all. On 
the other hand, another study found that most parents support 
mandatory screening of diseases that present in infancy, even if 
no treatment is available,299 suggesting that for some parents 
elimination of the diagnostic odyssey, even if nothing can be 
done, is important for childhood illnesses. 
The fact that parents are not clamoring to give consent for 
NBS or that they seem to prefer opt-out over opt-in approaches, 
ironically, may support an opt-in approach. The typical reason 
for their views is a concern that other parents would not 
consent. This supports the findings that when consent is 
required, there is actually a high level of acquiescence.300 In 
other words, the majority of parents would likely consent to 
NBS themselves; they do not want consent requirements 
because they fear that other parents would not consent. This 
reasoning alone does not, of course, necessarily overcome the 
concerns of cost, time, and logistical demands associated with 
affirmative consent.301 
What further argues in favor of the opt-in approach is the 
fact that parents consistently express a strong desire for 
education and information regarding NBS, which they are not 
getting.302 Overall, studies suggest that parents “were more 
troubled over the lack of NBS education than by the lack of 
                                                          
 297. Id. at 246. 
 298. L.E. Hasegawa et al., Parental Attitudes Toward Ethical and Social 
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consent.”303 Many urge that such education should happen in 
the less hectic prenatal, as opposed to newborn, period when 
they would be less preoccupied.304 If the goal is primarily to 
satisfy parental requests for information, it may be that 
requiring affirmative consent is the best way to do that. Studies 
have shown that seeking affirmative consent can increase 
parental knowledge in the context of research studies.305 In 
addition, as noted above, the incentives to provide some 
information about NBS are greater with an opt-in as compared 
with an opt-out approach. Thus, a powerful justification for 
requiring opt-in for NBS itself is to enhance the chances that 
parents understand something about NBS, which can satisfy 
their desires and likely promote the effectiveness of NBS. 
If we could trust that the education would happen in the 
prenatal, or even newborn, period, the case for opting in would 
be weaker. The current inadequacy of parental education, 
however, not only supports the opt-in requirement as a method 
to try to ensure that such education occurs;306 it is relevant in 
another respect. An opt-out approach is only protective of 
autonomous decision making it if is informed refusal.307 If 
parents are not adequately educated about NBS, or even worse 
that NBS occurs and that they can refuse, the opt-out approach 
makes a mockery of the notion of autonomous decision making 
and informed refusal. Instead, it merely leaves parents with an 
empty legal right to refuse. Even if most parents, when 
educated about NBS, would choose not to opt out, many who do 
not opt out are not making an affirmative choice because they 
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did not know about NBS or the opportunity to opt out.308 In 
short, the opt-out approach under the current circumstances is 
so far from true consent or informed decision making that it is 
hard to argue that it does anything at all to promote 
autonomy.309 
If providers were to offer the kind of information about 
NBS that would make the opt-out approach truly informed 
refusal, the process would be quite close to informed consent. At 
that point, the distinctions between opt-out and opt-in are 
simply not that great. Indeed, studies show that if individuals 
are adequately informed, the number who opt in is the inverse 
of those who opt out.310 One of the reasons for the opt-out is the 
idea of “nudging” people to make the “right” choices.311 Given 
that the parent community is, based both on parents’ views and 
surveys of parents’ choices, not a community that needs to be 
nudged with respect to NBS, and given the added incentives to 
educate parents that opt-ins provide, the case of opt-in over opt-
out becomes greater. 
While there has been a long tradition opposing an opt-in 
approach, the reasons for reconsidering this approach are 
quickly growing.312 First, the fact that the broader panel of 
diseases increases the risks of false positives or the possibility 
of incidental findings of uncertain clinical relevance means that 
some of the psychosocial risks of NBS are increasing.313 
Parental awareness of NBS may prepare parents for and 
therefore decrease the anxiety and confusion associated with 
false positives and diagnostically ambiguous results, for 
example.314 Parents who understand in advance that NBS is 
merely a screening, and not a diagnostic, procedure and that a 
positive result is not determinative are less likely to experience 
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anxiety with respect to a false positive than parents who did not 
even know their child was screened.315 To the extent that an 
opt-in approach promotes parents’ awareness of NBS, this 
approach might function, in part, as a prophylactic to this 
concern. 
Second, as the panel of diseases screened for expands to 
include diseases for which there is limited or no ameliorative 
treatment in the newborn period, the rationale for testing 
without consent disappears. The entire justification for 
screening without consent is the idea that the state is 
protecting newborns from suffering the harms of treatable 
conditions, which is not true with untreatable conditions.316 In 
this instance, as with storing and doing research on DBS, the 
parens patriae notion used to justify screening treatable 
conditions without consent does not exist. As a result, the 
argument for affirmative consent in these cases becomes 
significantly stronger. 
The fact that there is serious consideration of including 
whole genome or exome sequencing in NBS317 should give us 
even more reason to be skeptical of opt-out approaches, for both 
of the reasons discussed above. Whatever concerns we might 
have about expanded panels of NBS with respect to false 
positives, incidental and ambiguous findings, and information 
about conditions for which there is no treatment are bound to be 
magnified considerably by the sheer amount of information that 
whole genome/exome sequencing (WG/ES) can generate. Indeed, 
for that reason, there is a very strong case to be made against 
nudging parents toward consent for WG/ES NBS and a very 
strong argument for giving parents affirmative choice—i.e., the 
opt-in approach. 
Even if one were to argue that opt-outs are important to 
“nudge” parents into consenting to testing for serious, treatable 
conditions, as states expand their NBS panels to include 
conditions for which there are no treatments or WG/ES, this 
rationale cannot apply to the full range of screening. Rather 
than use an opt-out approach for all of the NBS, it would be 
preferable to tier the decision-making process so that there is 
only an option to opt out of screening for treatable conditions, 
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and perhaps only for those that express in childhood. Parents, 
however, would have to opt in for the rest. Of course, for the 
reasons I gave above, I believe opt-in for all NBS is preferable. 
Moreover, the administrative difficulties of setting up two 
consent approaches for different types of diseases further 
argues for a single approach, in this case, opt-in.318 But given 
the strong impetus in favor of opt-out for treatable conditions, it 
seems extremely important to ensure that consent is 
affirmative, and not presumed, when it comes to conditions for 
which there is no treatment, especially if they are late-onset 
conditions. 
Finally, my arguments for seeking affirmative consent for 
the storage and future use of the DBS offer a final reason to 
advocate for opt-in approaches to NBS generally. Efforts to seek 
consent for research and storage of samples would effectively 
necessitate a discussion about NBS generally. It is only a 
minimal extra step to seek consent for the screening itself. 
Some might argue that each new decision that parents are 
confronted with or asked to make complicates and slows down 
the overall process. It seems difficult, however, to discuss the 
collection, storage, and research use of DBS without first 
explaining NBS and its purpose, at least in general terms. 
Given that parental awareness of NBS is likely to promote 
successful NBS, and given that parents want to be educated 
about the program, the general discussions about NBS that an 
affirmative consent rule would require seem very much in line 
with what would be required for a discussion of storage and 
research uses. As a result, promoting parental awareness of 
NBS through affirmative consent seems well worth the time. 
While this might not satisfy the notion of fully informed 
consent, it might achieve the best compromise between parental 
autonomy and the common good. It fulfills our prima facie 
duties to promote individual autonomy, while also honoring our 
prima facie duties as a society to protect the physical welfare of 
newborns by informing parents about NBS generally and 
seeking, rather than simply presuming, their affirmative 
consent. 
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CONCLUSION 
As I have argued, the dignitary principle of respect that is 
central to autonomy and consent should remain central to all 
aspects of the NBS program from the moment the samples are 
collected to the moment the state considers using the samples. 
While autonomy should not be the overriding principle in 
determining what approach to take, there is a risk in deciding 
that the state’s interest in helping newborns and advancing 
science will run roughshod over the family’s autonomy interests 
and the child’s privacy and future autonomy interests in 
determining the extent to which he or she wants to participate 
in research. As we have seen, many of the public goods may 
actually be advanced by approaches that recognize the value of 
autonomy and privacy, with appropriate limits, so as not to 
hinder the ability to protect newborns or engage in certain 
valuable research projects. 
Underlying the goal of achieving the appropriate balance 
between the public good and individual interests is a third 
consideration: the need for transparency when the government 
has control over samples with highly personal information. 
Whatever balance of autonomy and promotion of research 
governments choose, they owe a fiduciary obligation to the 
citizenry to act not only for the benefit of the public, but to 
assure there is public authorization and transparency. The 
public’s trust in the government is at stake in the development 
of NBS research programs.319 This argues for educating the 
public not only about the existing NBS policies, but also about 
new approaches the state is considering so that the public may 
share in deliberations over the delicate balance between the 
public and private interests. To quote John Rawls, it is essential 
for a “well-ordered society” to resolve such difficult matters 
based on “the ideals and principles expressed by society’s 
conception of political justice, and conducted open to view on 
that basis.”320 Until the government does a better job of 
educating parents about the full spectrum of issues and 
decisions it has made with respect to NBS, this will not be 
possible. This article is a call to the states to ensure that they 
move toward such openness. 
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